



RESEARCH PAPER

No. 163

AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2013

**TAYYIP ERDOGAN THE LONELY LEVANTINE PADISHA
OF THE MIDDLE EAST**

NICKOLAOS MAVROMATES

(Security Analyst, RIEAS Research Associate based in USA)

ISSN: 2241-6358

Devoted to the memory of Prof. Neoklis Sarris (1940-2011)

**RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES
(RIEAS)**

1, Kalavryton Street, Alimos, Athens, 17456, Greece

RIEAS: <http://www.rieas.gr>

RIEAS MISSION STATEMENT

Objective

The objective of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) is to promote the understanding of international affairs. Special attention is devoted to transatlantic relations, intelligence studies and terrorism, European integration, international security, Balkan and Mediterranean studies, Russian foreign policy as well as policy making on national and international markets.

Activities

The Research Institute for European and American Studies seeks to achieve this objective through research, by publishing its research papers on international politics and intelligence studies, organizing seminars, as well as providing analyses via its web site. The Institute maintains a library and documentation center. RIEAS is an institute with an international focus. Young analysts, journalists, military personnel as well as academicians are frequently invited to give lectures and to take part in seminars. RIEAS maintains regular contact with other major research institutes throughout Europe and the United States and, together with similar institutes in Western Europe, Middle East, Russia and Southeast Asia.

Status

The Research Institute for European and American Studies is a non-profit research institute established under Greek law. RIEAS's budget is generated by membership subscriptions, donations from individuals and foundations, as well as from various research projects. The Institute is autonomous organization. Its activities and views are independent of any public or private bodies, and the Institute is not allied to any political party, denominational group or ideological movement.

Dr. John M. Nomikos

Director

RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES (RIEAS)

1, Kalavryton Street, Alimos, Athens, 17456, Greece

Tel/Fax: + 30 210 9911214, E-mail: rieasinfo@gmail.com

Administrative Board

John M. Nomikos, Director

Ioannis Galatas, Senior Advisor

Antonia Dimou, Senior Advisor

Daniel Little, Senior Advisor

Zhyldyz Oskonbaeva, Senior Advisor and Eurasian Liaison

Yannis Stivachtis, Senior Advisor

Darko Trifunovic, Senior Advisor

Charles Rault, Senior Advisor

George Vardangalos, Development Manager

Academic Advisor

Tassos Symeonides, (PhD)

Research Team

Andrew Liaropoulos, Senior Analyst

Aya Burweila, Senior Analyst

Dimitris Bekiaris, Senior Analyst

International Advisors

Richard R. Valcourt, Editor-in-Chief, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Shlomo Shpiro (PhD), Bar Ilan University, Israel

Prof. Rose Mary Sheldon (PhD), Virginia Military Institute, USA

Ruben Arcos (PhD), Chair Intelligence Services and Democratic Systems, Rey Juan Carlos University, Spain

Prof. Yonah Alexander (PhD), Director of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies' International Center for Terrorism Studies, USA

Prof. Robert Goodwin III (PhD), President, New Westminster College, Canada

Robert J. Heibel, Founder & Business Developer, Institute for Intelligence Studies, Merchyhurst University, USA

Prof. Sotiris Roussos (PhD), University of Peloponnese, Greece

Joseph Fitsanakis (PhD), Instructor and Coordinator in the Security and Intelligence Studies Program, King University, USA

Leroy D. Baca, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles, California, USA

Prof. Deng-Kei Lee (PhD), National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Gurmant Grewal (MBA), Governor and Co-Chair of the Board of Governors of New Westminster College, Canada

Christ G. Pelaghias, Chairman, European Rim Policy and Investment Council (ERPIC), Cyprus

Ambassador Patrick N. Theros, President and Executive Director, US-QATAR Business Council

Ambassador George-Cristian Maior (PhD), Director, Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI)

Don McDowell (MAIPIO, CCA) Principal, College of Intelligence Studies (UK)

Keshav Mazumdar (CPO ,CRC,CMAS,ATO) Intelligencer , Certified Master Antiterrorism Specialist

Ken Kotani (PhD), Senior Fellow, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan

Prof. Vittorfranco Pisano (J.S.D.), Research Director, Multinational Intelligence Studies Campus, Belgium

David Scharia (PhD), Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, United Nations Security Council

Prof. Mario Caligiuri (PhD), University of Calabria

Prof. Daniel Pipes (PhD), Director, Middle East Forum

Ioannis Anastasakis, Lt General (ret), Middle East Regional Security and Economic Development Expert

Prof. Miroslav Tudjman (PhD), University of Zagreb and Former Director of the Croatian Intelligence Service Dr.

Philip H. J. Davis, (PhD), Director, Brunel Center for Intelligence and Security Studies

Prof. Degang Sun, (Phd), Shanghai International Studies University

Prof. Robert R. Friedmann, (PhD), Georgia State University Col (ret) Virendra Sahai Verma, Former Military Intelligence Officer from India

James Bilotto, CBRN Chief Operating Officer

Prof. Anthony Glees (PhD), Director, Center for Security and Intelligence Studies, Buckingham University

Prof. Vasilis Botopoulos (PhD), Chancellor, University of Indianapolis (Athens Campus)

Prof. Peter Gill (PhD), University of Salford

Andrei Soldatov (MA), Journalist, Editor of Agentura.ru

(Russia)

Chris Kuehl, Armada Corporate Intelligence Review
Zweiri Mahjoob (PhD), Centre for Strategic Studies, Jordan
University

Prof. Siegfried Beer (PhD), Director, Austrian Centre for
Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies

Prof. Herman Matthijs (PhD), Free University of Brussels

Prof. Michael Wala (PhD), University of Munich

Prof. Wolfgang Krieger (PhD), University of Marburg

Michael Tanji, Director at Threatswatch.org - (OSINT)

Prof. Ioannis Mazis (PhD), University of Athens

Robert Nowak (PhD Cand), Institute of History of the Polish
Academy of Sciences, Bureau of the
Committee for Special and Intelligence Services (Prime
Minister's Chancellery)

Lauren Hutton (PhD), Researcher, Institute for Security Studies
(South Africa)

LTC General, Prof. Iztok Podbregar (PhD), University of
Maribor, Former National Security Advisor to the President of
the Republic of Slovenia, Former Chief of Defense (CHOD),
Former Director of the Slovenian Intelligence and Security
Agency, Former Secretary of the Slovenian National Security
Council.

Prof. Gregory F. Treverton, (PhD), Senior Policy Analyst,
Pardee RAND Graduate School

David Jimenez (MA), American Military University (American
Public University System)

Sebastien Laurent (PhD), Universite Michel de Montaigne,
Bordeaux

Warren Tamplin, (MA), OSINT Officer, Australia

Col (ret) Jan-Inge Svensson, Swedish Military Academy

Prof. M.L. Maniscalco (PhD), University of Rome (Tre)

Anat Lapidot-Firilla (PhD), The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute

Julian Droogan (PhD), Editor, Journal of Policing, Intelligence
and Counter Terrorism, Macquarie University, Australia.

Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos (PhD), U.S. Air Force Research
Institute

Prof Antonio Diaz, (PhD), University of Cadiz, Spain

Prof. Thomas Wegener Friis (PhD), University of Southern
Denmark

Prof. Ake Sellstrom (PhD) European CBRNE Center, Sweden

Prof. Rudiger Lohlker (PhD), University of Vienna

Com. Ioannis Chapsos HN (PhD Cand.) Hellenic Supreme Joint
War College

Demitrios Krieris (MA), Police Major, Hellenic CEPOL Unit

Prof. Prodromos Yannas (PhD), Dean, Technological Educational Institution (TEI) in the Western Macedonia, Greece

Armen Oganessian (PhD), Editor, Journal of International Affairs, Russia

Petrus Duvenage (PhD), University of Pretoria, South Africa
Mark Street, Director, Promoting International Collaboration, Israel

Aggelos Liapis (PhD), Research and Development, European Dynamics

Ron Schleifer (PhD), Ariel Research Center for Defense and Communication, Israel

Zefi Dimadama (PhD), Director General, International Centre for Black Sea Studies, Greece

Prof. Anis Bajrektarevic (PhD), University of Applied Sciences IMC-Krems, Austria

Zijad Bećirović, Director, IFIMES International Institute, Slovenia

Prof. Kiyul Chung (PhD), School of Journalism and Communication, Tsinghua University, China

Prof Klaus Lange (PhD), Director, Institute for Transnational Studies, Germany

Nicolas Laos (PhD), Founder and President of the Kairological Society- Reality Restructuring Resources Inc.

Mr. Stuart Allen, (ACFEI; ABCHS; ASIS; IEEE; AES;) President, Criminologist and Chief Forensic Investigator of covert recorded evidence, at The Legal Services Group, IMSI (USA)

Mark Birdsall, Editor, Eyespymagazine, UK

Dimitris Tsitos, Author, Greece

Hanna Shelest (PhD), National Institute for Strategic Studies, Ukraine

Grigorios Balakos, Lieutenant General (ret), Greek Police

Prof. Alexander Bligh (PhD), Ariel University, Israel Col SK

Chakravarty (ret), Indian Army

Prof. Andrey Kortunov (PhD), President, New Eurasia Foundation, Russia

Prof. R. Banerji, IAS (retd.), Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, India

Prof. Sohail Mahmood (PhD), International Islamic University, Pakistan

Ioannis Syrigos (PhD), Computer Engineer, New technologies researcher, Managing Director of ChiefAim Ltd.

Diego Bonila (PhD), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain

Research Associates

Nickolaos Mavromates (MA), Greek-Israeli Relations
Prem Mahadevan (PhD), Indian Counter Intelligence Studies
Leo S. F. Lin, (MA), Foreign Affairs Police Officer in Taiwan
(R.O.C)
Ioannis Konstantopoulos, (PhD), Intelligence Studies
Spyridon Katsoulas, (PhD Candidate) Greek-American
Relations
Ioannis Kolovos (MA), Illegal Immigration in Greece
Christodoulos Ioannou (MA), European Intelligence Studies
Liam Bellamy (MA), Maritime Security (Piracy)
Naveed Ahmad (MA), South-Central Asia and Muslim World
Ioannis Moutsos (MA), Independent Journalist
Nadim Hasbani (MA), Lebanon-Syria and North African States
Nikos Lalazisis (MA), European Intelligence Studies
George Protopapas (MA), Journalist, International Relations
Researcher
Roman Gerodimos (PhD Candidate), Greek Politics Specialist
Group in UK
Nico Prucha (PhD Cand), Jihadism on Line Studies
Nikolas Stylianou (MA), Cyprus and European Studies
Kyriaki Kafyra (MA), Southeast European Studies and Law
Alexis Giannoulis (MA), Intelligence Studies
Konstantinos Saragkas, (MSc , LSE), ESDP/European
Armaments Cooperation
Junichi Hiramatsu (PhD Cand), U.S. Intelligence Studies, Japan
Ioanna Mastora (PhD), Hellenic Police Communication Studies
Petros Makris-Kourkoulos (MA), Energy Security Studies
Fotini Rizava, (PhD), Transnational Organized Crime Studies

RESEARCH PAPER

No. 163

AUGUST 2013

TAYYIP ERDOGAN THE LONELY LEVANTINE PADISHA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

NICKOLAOS MAVROMATES

(Security Analyst, RIEAS Research Associate based in USA)

ISSN: 2241-6358

Devoted to the memory of Prof. Neoklis Sarris (1940-2011)

Abstract

This paper examines how even after the Gezi protests and Egypt's President's Morsi's ousting, Erdoğan's interior political enemies still lack the initiative to depose him or derail his political agenda. It also discusses how Erdoğan is working methodically in order to achieve his political goals by using his opponents weakness and strengths for his behalf. Ranging from the kemalist Secular forces to his former religious ally Fetulah Gülen, culminating to the Kurdish aspirations for autonomy. Finally, this paper is concluding with the emergence of a new political persona that has the potential to become the new premier of Turkey, which happens to be no other than his confidant and personal security and intelligence services Chief, Dr. Hakan Fidan.

*"[A] strong Turkey is not wanted in the region," Erdoğan said."*¹

The recent ousting by the Egyptian Army of Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi, a key player and Islamic ally of Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has significantly added peripheral threats to the latter's already interior daily drama of political confrontations that could easily disrupt Erdoğan's Yeni-Osmanli (Neo-Ottoman) agenda for the region.

¹ "Military coups now prepared in squares and on social media, like in Egypt: Turkish PM" ,11,July,2013,Hurriyetdailynews, availableat:<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/military-coups-now-prepared-in-squares-and-on-social-media-like-in-egypt-turkish-pm.aspx?PageID=238&NID=50547&NewsCatID=338>

More precisely, as the *Padishah* (one of the titles given to the Sultan) and his close accolades convened under the guidance of his most trusted head of the Turkish Intelligence agency (MIT) Dr. Hakan Fidan to cope with the Taksim Square protests, the current situation in Egypt has added additional urgency and will to tackle his stratagems.² At present the *Padishah's* inner cabal was forced to take drastic actions in order to cope with the new set of realities that has manifested itself around Anatolia's periphery. Not only has Erdoğan's strategic goals such as the success of Egypt's Islamic government, the isolating of Israel, and the derailing of Greek and Cypriot hopes of a unified energy hub with Tel Aviv crashed, but his long planned visit to Gaza has been postponed indefinitely. This has dealt a severe blow to his image as the future unifier and protector of Sunni Islam, but also as the supporter of any Muslim causes in the world, such as Turkey's insistence of raising the agenda of the Muslim Uighur in China and the Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar.

It is apparent that Turkish Foreign Policy now will be tested to the outmost. Simultaneously, however Tayip Erdoğan, will have to tackle his political enemies within Turkey thus, giving him a gigantic task to settle his political differences once and for all.

Interior perils of Erdogan's authority

His first course of action will be to strengthen his power inside Anatolia (Asian Turkey) his main power base and detect and crush any potential mini coups designed either by new Taksim protests or by the institutional norms of the ancient regime that still hold power which are mainly concentrated in the Judicial system. As an example, on July 3, 2013, it was announced by the First Administrative Court in Istanbul that it had cancelled the Taksim Square

² "Turkish PM holds 3-hour Egypt meeting attended by FM, intelligence chief", *04, July, 2013*, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-holds-3-hour-egypt-meeting-attended-by-fm-intelligence-chief.aspx?pageID=238&nid=50012>

and Gezi Park redevelopment project that had triggered the unprecedented anti-government protests in Istanbul and all over Turkey.³ For Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the decision was a blow to his authority vis-à-vis his goals for the Ottomanization of Istanbul and eventually the rest of Anatolia. However, Erdoğan did not sit idle and take this affront to his authority. His administration through judicial procedures had the original verdict repealed, paving the way for the Padishah to rebuild his Ottoman Topçu Barracks that were demolished by the İstanbul authorities in 1940.

In any case, Erdoğan's, past bitterness against the Judicial system stems from his being barred from joining the political landscape in the late 90s due to his Islamic leanings, to Abdullah Gül's being barred from running for president because his wife wore a Islamic headscarf.⁴ Therefore amending the constitution that has its genesis and all laws, stemming from the coup of Sept 12, 1980 is a necessity for him. It has become apparent to Erdoğan, that the Kemalist elites, his worldwide enemies⁵ and ironically some of his former allies, have plotted his character assassination and want to destroy his image with the Turkish public and also to the Muslim world.

³ Turkish court blocks disputed park project near Taksim Square, 03,July,2013,Zaman,available at: http://todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=319956&columnistId=0

⁴ Metin Toprak & Nasuh Uslu, " The Headscarf Controversy in Turkey", Journal of Economic and Social Research,01,November,2009, p.55,available at: <http://jesr.journal.fatih.edu.tr/jesr.toprak.uslu.pdf>

⁵ Prime minister Erdoğan not only criticized his domestic opponents, foreign governments, international media, but he even went further in labeling that an interest Lobby (*Jewish financiers*) was also behind the Gezi protests. He did not even hesitate to correlate that those who claimed that were representing kemal's ideas during the protests in reality they were actually working on behalf of the Interest lobby. In other words branding the opposition as an instrument of Jewish conspiracy theories. Erdoğan s statement goes as following: "[T]hey went out saying they were the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal and they became the interest rate lobby's unpaid soldiers."... Quoted from, Erdoğan says interest rate lobby only winner in Turkey protests,22,June,2013, Zaman,availableat:http://todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=88CD508419748682423D87C7763520C5?newsId=318984&columnistId=0. A position that was also repeated by his deputy minister Besir Atalay and Turkey's EU Minister and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis thus, signifying the state of mind of how AKP actually sees the prism of the current Turkish Israeli relations, See, Turkey's EU minister blames 'interest rate lobby' for protests in developing countries, 19 ,June, 2013, ANADOLU AGENCY, available at: <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/194885--c>. See, also, Turkish Deputy PM says Jewish Diaspora behind Gezi protests, 2, July, 2013,Zaman,.,available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-319776-turkish-deputy-pm-says-jewish-diaspora-behind-gezi-protests.html>

A policy by his enemies that is aimed in discrediting and wrecking his administration and Neo-Osmanli policies in the region, is not of any surprise. We witnessed Erdoğan's, vicious cracking down on Gezi Park supporters and their sympathizers who he deemed were pushing such a policy. Not only were dozens of protestors and participants that used electronic media to amass support for the Gezi Park protesters were arrested, but the ruling AKP Party also moved with vengeance against anybody that even aided the protests. The AKP's revenge started with the Chamber of Architects and Engineers' (TMMOB).⁶ A chamber of professionals which had actively taken part at the Gezi Park protests. An action of solidarity that did not go unnoticed by Erdoğan's fury. In a scrupulous motion the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) passed a bill that, eliminated this occupational chambers from any future city-planning procedures, thus removing the obligation of the chambers' approval of projects. Its aim, was not only to castigate the TOMMB, but to restrain similar solidarity actions by other institutions in Turkey in the near future.

Furthermore, as a response to the Gezi Park protests which have been led by young university students Erdoğan declared that the police forces will replace private security companies in public Universities, therefore they needed to be regulated from repeating similar actions. His following statement which reflect his actions: "*[I]f you use violence, you will face violence.*"⁷ Erdoğan's revenge culminated with placing fines on news agencies that apparently defamed his police forces⁸ handling of the Gezi Protestors. Worth mentioning also is the

⁶ Turkish court blocks disputed park project near Taksim Square,03,July,2013,Zaman,available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-319956-.html>

⁷ "Police to replace private security in public universities: Turkish PM",12,July,2013, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-to-replace-private-security-in-public-universities-turkish-pm.aspx?pageID=238&nID=50625&NewsCatID=338>

⁸ " PM Erdoğan says Turkish police subject of constant 'dark propaganda' during Gezi protests", 24,July,2013, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pm-erdogan-says-turkish-police-subject-of-constant-dark-propaganda-during-gezi-protests.aspx?pageID=238&nid=51367>

continuous harassment by the government of lawyers or companies that contested his administration policies.⁹

What really matters is that Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, is moving in a methodical pattern to cement his rule. He never wavers from the premeditated and institutionalized Islamization of Turkey. Since the start of his administration out of 75.941 Mosques that existed into the vicinity of Anatolia in 2002, 8.734 more were added.¹⁰ An accomplishment that is reminiscent of Premier Adnan Menderes in the 1950's.

Also Erdoğan's administration still refuses to accept the Alevi's¹¹(a Shia sect) plight to get recognized as a religious minority and have their spiritual centers the Cemevi, elevated to an equal status in Turkish society and his support of the Sunni rebels in Syria's civil war. As a

9 During the Gezi protests some demonstrators sought refuge into the Divan hotel to protect themselves from Police brutality. However, because of this incident and the fact that the Divan Hotel it is owned by the Koç family which happens to be of Jewish descent, Erdoğan seems to have found a victim against the so called Interest Lobby. More precisely as an act of vengeance and a warning to Koç Holdings the government has ordered a finance inspection over allegations of manufacturing smuggled fuel into two of his best Holdings in Turkey. The oil refinery Tüpraş and gas firm Aygaz. However, Erdoğan's fury did not stop there. He personally proposed the cancellation of the construction of six Ada class corvettes slated to the Koc RMK Marine shipyards as part of Defense contract by the Turkish government. All these reprisal actions to Koc Holdings can also be seen as a retaliation against Israel's policy vis-à-vis the Mavi Marmara compensation procedures which have stalled lately. Therefore it is not insignificant that similarly Tel Aviv has ordered in a tit for tat action against the (THY)Turkish Airlines Israel office over allegations the company breached Israeli tax laws. See, "Tax probe at Koç-owned firms drives shares down",25,July,2013, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/tax-probe-at-koc-owned-firms-drives-shares-down-.aspx?pageID=238&NID=51378&NewsCatID=345>. See, also, THY faces investigation for alleged tax fraud in Israel,30,July,2013,Zama,available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-322230-thy-faces-investigation-for-alleged-tax-fraud-in-israel.html>. See, also, Ariel Ben Solomon, "US lawmakers slam Erdogan's 'anti-Semitic' statements", 02, August,2013,The Jerusalem Post, available at:<http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/US-lawmakers-slam-Erdogans-anti-Semitic-statements-321859>. See, also, "Report: Proposed cancellation of Koç's Milgem contract approved by Erdoğan," 07,August,2013,Zaman,available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-323082-report-proposed-cancellation-of-kocs-milgem-contract-approved-by-erdogan.html>

¹⁰ According with Turkstat there is a rise of new build mosques in Anatolia, but also it should be noted that Erdoğan administration decided to rebuild old abandoned and damaged Mosques in Turkey. The Directorate General for Foundations (VGM) President Adnan Ertem institutionalized the above policy when he announced the g plans to rebuild some of the 150 Mosques around the country that have vanished over time, due to political or accidental reasons . It goes without saying that the Padishah is moving even further by changing the Status of former Christian Churches from their Museum status to Mosques once more. The case of Ayia Sofia of Trebizond and the Ayia Sophia of Iznic are the latest cases while a parliamentary commission is also considering an application to reopen Istanbul's Hagia Sophia Museum for prayers. See, "Trabzon's Hagia Sophia to open for prayers",05,February,2013, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/trabzons-hagia-sophia-to-open-for-prayers.aspx?pageID=238&nid=40538>. See, also, " Turkey to rebuild 'lost' mosques. See, also,"Τουρκία: 8 χιλιάδες Τζαμιά δημιουργήθηκαν τα τελευταία 11 χρόνια", 15,July,2013,Echedoros, available at: "<http://www.echedoros-a.gr/2013/07/8-11.html>

¹¹ Murat Yetkin, Alevis and their religious rights, 03,July,2013, Hurriyetdailynews, available at:<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/alevis-and-their-religious-rights.aspx?pageID=449&nID=49918&NewsCatID=409>

result, he is alienating them and pushing them to the periphery of the opposition and even to possible violent acts against the Sunnification of the Turkish state and its Levantine policies.¹² To make matters worse, the fact that Istanbul's third bridge project, was proposed to be named after the Ottoman Sultan Selim Yavuz (the Grim), the First Ottoman Caliph, who butchered more than 40,000 Alevi's during his reign in the 16th century, further raised tension with the Alevi community. This religious provocation is just the tip of the iceberg. This is one problem that in the near future is not nominally handled along with the Kurdish question might add more issues into **Turkey's Pandora Box**.

Moreover, it should be said that the *Padishah* is meticulously reinstating all public workers, or military officers that were removed from civic positions on anti-secular charges during the Feb. 28 1997, Army memorandum that ousted the Islamist Erbakan's Refah government.¹³ Paradoxically, due to alleged and actual facts of Turkey's Military executive elite *Coup d'état plans*, (Ergenekon and Balyoz) against his government, Erdoğan's authority only grows stronger.¹⁴ Using this as an excuse, the *Padishah* has managed to subdue and purge all his military opponents thus, having an autocephalous military under his own spell¹⁵ which was a major

¹² The Alevis of Turkey have a tendency to sympathize with the Baathist system of Syria and their co religious brethren that of the Alawites plight to keep Syria secular even under a single party authority. Something that Turkey witnessed in the past under Kemalism. Murat Yetkin goes even further by denoting if not clearly the possibility of Turkey having another headache similar like the Kurdish national aspirations if the Sunni majority completely ignores their religious rights and plights for equal representation in the Turkish Sunni society. See, Murat Yetkin, "Syria war at the gates of Turkey", 18, July, 2013, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/syria-war-at-the-gates-of-turkey.aspx?pageID=449&nID=50927&NewsCatID=409>. See, also, Mustafa Akyol, "Why the Turkish Opposition Likes Assad" 13, March, 2013, ALMONITOR, available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/turkey-opposition-chp-assad-meeting-syria.html>

¹³ "Victims of Feb. 28 to be given jobs back", 7, July, 2013, Zaman, available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-320252-victims-of-feb-28-to-be-given-jobs-back.html>. See, also, "Harmonization bill to reinstate all rights of YAŞ victims ready", 8 January 2011, Zaman, available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=231865

¹⁴ "Turkish court returns verdicts over Ergenekon plot against government", 05, August, 2013, The Guardian, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/turkish-court-verdicts-ergenekon-plot>. For more information about the Ergenekon Coup d'état case see, also "Ergenekon file - Part 1", 17, August, 2008, Zaman, available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-150458-ergenekon-file-part-1.html>

¹⁵ According with newspaper Zaman Gendarmerie Commander Bekir Kalyoncu was refused to become the next supreme commander of the Turkish Armed Forces on the grounds that he is against the current PKK settlement process and past

turning point in Turkish political life. The Current Chief of General Staff Gen. Necdet Özel is a faithful supporter of the AKP. Creating his own faithful religious oriented military cadres that can be trusted in time of political instability at least for the foreseeable future has helped guarantee his survival.¹⁶ It goes without saying, that a similar processes of Islamization of the Foreign Ministry cadres is also currently taking place as well.¹⁷

Now as far as his political institutionalized opponents (CHP, MHP) and former Islamic allies (Fetulah Gülen), Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is moving scrupulously, and vigilantly to marginalize them. The only loyal personality that can he rely on for his security and his personal agenda, is no other than the head of the Turkish National Intelligence (MIT) and energetic undersecretary Dr. Hakan Fidan, whom he has amply rewarded him by placing him in charge of Turkey's Intelligence service in 2010.

CHP- Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi

What Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, political existence has taught him is that his main rival the Kemalist Republican People's Party or CHP party has unresolved issues which needs to be resolved first in order to properly challenge him. Most precisely CHP leadership like

antigovernment stance against AKP in 2006. See, "TSK's entrenched traditions become history at latest YAŞ meeting", 04, August, 2013, Zaman, available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-322776-tsk-entrenched-traditions-become-history-at-latest-yas-meeting.html>

¹⁶ Tayyip Erdoğan has managed to assign more powers to the Interior Ministry by placing Army Units under its spell in case of emergency. In other words giving local provincial governors' the power to use local military units to quell unrest if needed. See, "TSK confirms new protocol with Interior Ministry on domestic security", 01, July, 2013, Zaman, available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-319687-tsk-confirms-new-protocol-with-interior-ministry-on-domestic-security.html>

¹⁷ The AKP government is actually cementing its presence into the former elitist but yet kemalist Foreign Ministry. Not only is flushing out through retirement procedures its opponents but also is placing its own cadres for its future endeavors. More precisely it passed a law that, allows those who are not members of the Foreign Ministry but appointed as ambassadors abroad to keep their ambassador title and take up senior positions after the end of their term. In other words not only is Islamizing it's foreign Policy branch but also is shielding Erdoğan' from possible sabotage to his policies. See, "Former Turkish FM's and envoys call on president to veto controversial foreign service bill", 22, July, 2013, Hurriyetdailynews available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/former-turkish-fms-and-envoys-call-on-president-to-veto-controversial-foreign-service-bill.aspx?pageID=238&nID=51140&NewsCatID=338>

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and its nowadays political elite is composed mainly by Alevi,¹⁸ sectarians along with secular officials that are connected with Turkey's Kemalist military interference history. Just the fact that CHP representatives were caught among the Ergenekon and Balyoz coup accomplices against the AKP government says no more.

Secondly, the CHP is split between two blocs, one that represents the Nationalist, Kemalist version and the old status quo and a smaller one that wants to transform itself on a European Social Democratic platform. Unfortunately, for them however, even the poll that was conducted immediately after the Gezi park protest shows that Erdoğan, still has an over 43 percent popular support in Turkish Politics.¹⁹ Despite the fact his main opponents the CHP and the MHP increased their overall percentages, the AKP leadership knows that majority of the masses that participated in the protests have never voted for the AKP Party and never would anyway. As Murat Yelkin perfectly states :

"[O]nly a fraction of them had voted for the CHP though, which makes them think about how to win them over for the local elections in March 2014, presidential elections in August 2014 and parliamentary elections in June 2015. To cut it short, there is not much potential for an

¹⁸ Mustapha Akyol "Why the Turkish Opposition Likes Assad" 13, March, 2013, ALMONITOR, available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/turkey-opposition-chp-assad-meeting-syria.html>. See, also, "Court refuses to release 67 Ergenekon suspects" 13, July, 2013, Zaman, available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-320787-court-refuses-to-release-67-ergenekon-suspects.html>

¹⁹ Murat Yetkin, "What can Erdoğan do to reverse the slide?" 19, July, 2013, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/what-can-erdogan-do-to-reverse-the-slide.aspx?pageID=238&nid=5107>. See, also, "How parties would stand if elections were held in Turkey Today" 19, July, 2013, Sabah, available at <http://english.sabah.com.tr/National/2013/07/19/results-of-the-past-5-years-of-election-polls>. See, also, "Support to AKP drops after Gezi rallies, say poll" 20, July, 2013, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/support-to-akp-drops-after-gezi-rallies-say-poll.aspx?pageID=238&nid=51064&NewsCatID=338>

*exchange of votes between the AK Party and CHP, at least under the current political circumstances."*²⁰

Furthermore, Tayyip Erdoğan holds another ace in his sleeves *vis-à-vis* his CHP opponents, that of his foreign policy orientation around Turkey's weakest neighbors. They ironically on this matter, share his aspirations about Turkish Hegemony in the region. In spite of everything, he continues his predecessors' expansionist policies with a pace of religious reverence namely against Greece, Bulgaria and Iraq. The only visible difference is that in Syria and Erdoğan's support of the rebels and for some elder CHP deputies and higher cadres in the Party, the country of Israel, which the Kemalists' had established an alliance with.

Today the *Padishah* is using Israel for his benefit in blurring his international intentions in the Levant by supporting the Palestinian cause, aiming above all in elevating Turkey's status versus Israel's military might in the area and by his insistence to have the Mavi Marmara victims compensated by Tel Aviv. It is not ironic when you can see, secular newspapers sharing his Osmanli dreams, like Milliyet a traditionally pro CHP promoting a map that encompasses half of Greece, Bulgaria, Syria and Iraq or having CHP deputies questioning his Aegean policies.²¹ Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, a chief ally of the Prime Minister and his Foreign Policy cadres in spite of divergence with CHP's political orientations, have showed greatly respect for its former politician and Grand Strategist Şükrü Elekdağ. His 2 1/2 War Strategy²² that was aimed against

²⁰ Murat Yetkin, "What can Erdoğan do to reverse the slide?" available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/what-can-erdogan-do-to-reverse-the-slide.aspx?pageID=238&nid=5107>

²¹ "Bulgaria Reacts with Disdain to Turkish Daily's Scandalous Map", 24, April, 2013, novinite, available at: http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=149834. See, also, "16 islands snatched by Greece due to Turkey's negligence, experts claim" 24, December, 2012, Zaman, available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-302086-16-islands-snatched-by-greece-due-to-turkeys-negligence-experts-claim.html>

²² Şükrü Elekdağ, 2 1/2 WAR STRATEGY, Retrieved, 22 July 2011, *Center for Strategic Research*, available at: <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SukruElekdag.pdf>

Greece, Syria and the PKK, Ankara's major perceived military threats during the late 1990's was the bible of the Turkish Foreign and Defense Ministry even after AKP's ascendance into power. After all the CHP might not adhere to AKP's Islamic tendencies in Anatolia's heartland and beyond its borders, but its regional dynamics and economic growth that stem from its course of action are ironically welcome as long they don't endanger Turkey's boundaries, their privileges and Kemal's Secular inheritance.²³

MHP- Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi

Now turning to his next constitutional political adversary that takes the form of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) the veil of differences between AKP and the Nationalists on Islamic and Strategically related plans for Anatolia's Status growth are minimal if not blurry. Primarily, their mainly divergence lay's on the fact that the MHP shared links with Turkey's once almighty military and Intelligence cabal and its refusal to accept the PKK current peace initiative that was orchestrated by, Dr. Hakan Fidan. Overall, however they share the same conservative cultural bonds that is intermingled between the religious right and the nationalistic dogma that lays in the esoteric Anatolian Turkic psych. A connection that has a name and it is called "ülküçü" or "idealists" in English. It happens to be a nationalistic youth movement that fights to protect Turkishness by any means and adheres a fanatical belief of the Pan-Turanian relationship with Central Asia's other Turkic states. For the "ülküçü" as Caleb Lauer affirms:

²³ It should be said that even under the religious and Conservative Turgut Özal's premiership, the Turkish private sector moved into Iraq, Iran and the Gulf States as well as signing "large scale construction contracts" in Libya. Therefore Ankara in reality is witnessing a continuation of this policy under a different administration but of similar religious connotation.. See, Nathaniel Handy, "Turkey's Shifting Relations with its Middle East Neighbors during the Davutoğlu Era: History, Power and Policy" Retrieved, 5, August, 2013, Bilgi University, p.63, available at: http://www.academia.edu/3533985/Turkeys_Shifting_Relations_with_its_Middle_East_Neighbors_during_the_Davutoglu_Era_History_Power_and_Policy

*"[t]he country's national security. Continuing a policy of the Ottoman Empire's last years, the Turkish Republic institutionalized the belief that only a common language, an idealized history, and Sunni Islam — all semi-purged of foreign, especially Arab, influence — could bind society together and prevent loss of territory."*²⁴

These political orientations could easily clarify why MHP's leader Devled Bahçeli during the Taksim protests, took a neutral but yet opposing stance versus the Protesters demands: *"[w]hatever happens, the sole remedy is democracy and whatever happens the only choice is to stay within the limits of legitimacy which means not to get provoked although you are exposed to tear gas."*²⁵ In other words he continued the same policy that his party took during the Republic protests of 2007 where he compared any protest against the government as a civil war act by claiming that: *"[s]uch an action would look like brothers in a fight"*²⁶

It is obvious then that for the nationalist front, what we call the "ülküçü" or "idealists" in English, a left wing Secular protest that composes many forces alien to their values automatically brings them to the support of the center right political spectrum, which, in this case it can translate into public support for the AKP's political agenda.²⁷ The results of the 2007 Turkish

²⁴ Caleb Lauer, " Turkey's National Action Party Resists Peace With PKK" 04,June,2011, ALMONITOR, available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/02/turkey-kurdish-peace-plan-derailed-pkk-mhp-identity-conflict.html>

²⁵ "MHP leader calls for common sense on Taksim Gezi Park protests", 04,June,2013,World Bulletin, available at: <http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=110515>

²⁶ As Galip Dalay points out this :[p]rotest is not the first public contention between different perspectives in defining Turkey. Rather, it is the latest evolution of a process that has spanned the past decade. In 2007, similar protests, more peaceful but more crowded, took place across major cities to prevent the AK Party's candidate, Abdullah Gul, from replacing the incumbent president on the grounds that his wife was wearing a headscarf.....Quoted from, Galip Dalay, "The contest to define Turkey",14,June,2013, Al Jazeera, available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/201361274621908186.html>

²⁷ Ceylan Ozbudak, "Are we seeing a 'Turkish Spring' on the streets of Istanbul?"02,June,2013,Al Arabiya ,available at: <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2013/06/02/Are-we-seeing-a-Turkish-Spring-on-the-streets-of-Istanbul-.html>. Gareth Jenkins describes the protestors of the Gezi Park: *"[a]s an extraordinary range of different groups and individuals - ranging from Marxists to anti-capitalist Muslims, hard-line secularists, Kurdish nationalists, Turkish nationalists, Alevis, environmentalists and gay and lesbian activists. The only characteristic that united them was a sense of being oppressed or marginalized by Erdoğan and the AKP"*Quoted from, Gareth Jenkins, Erdoğan, the AKP and the Repercussions of the Gezi Park Protests,05,July,2013, The Turkey Analyst, vol. 6 no. 13,available at:<http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/49-erdogan-the-akp-and-the-repercussions-of-the-gezi-park-protests.html>

national elections corroborate the above statement. Prime Minister Erdoğan is familiar with all these facts that surround MHP inner core, thus it is not unfeasible that he might try to win over the hardcore Sunni base within the MHP by further alienating the Alevi population of Turkey.

In the past MHP and Sunni extremism has caused many casualties among the Alevi population through massacres or pogroms (Kahramanmaraş in 1978) that have caused the Alevi community to seek protection through radical means.²⁸ Mainly joining radical leftist groups like the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C).²⁹

For MHP Turkish Nationalism and Turkey's projection as strong single country is above all politics. When it comes to AKP's Syria's policy, its main differences lies on the fact that Ankara underestimated Bassar's regime resistance against the FSA (Free Syrian Army) and its allies along with Syrian Kurdish aspirations as result of the instability. A strong resurgence of Syrian Kurdish nationalism can cause a domino effect in the area, if it remains unchecked and combines its strength with Anatolia's Turkish Kurds strong longing for independence.

Overall, in foreign policy the MHP has not taken a blurry attitude like the Kemalist CHP. When it comes to Israel and Egypt, Devlet Bahçeli immediately denounced the Egyptian coup, but also criticized President Morsi for failing to meet expectations and restore order in the Arab country. Especially, however he chastised the West where it failed short of strongly denouncing the *coup d'état* with its name. According to him: "[r]eactions to the ouster were important, as

²⁸ Murat Yetkin, "What can Erdoğan do to reverse the slide?" available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/what-can-erdogan-do-to-reverse-the-slide.aspx?pageID=238&nid=5107>

²⁹ Umre Ulsu points out that the Alevi dissatisfaction is been used by leftist terrorist groups like DHKP/C to express its grievances against the state and even state policies.. He specifically, claims that the DHKP/C exploits the Alevi community's grievances to recruit many of their militants. ...In reality, the historic roots of the DHKP/C are older than any terror organization in Turkey. It goes back to 1970s and it has had strong ties with Alevi communities since the foundation of the organization".....Quoted from, Umre Ulsu, "Causes behind DHKP/C shock among diplomats,"03,February,2013,Zaman,available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-306005-causes-behind-dhkc-shock-among-diplomats.html>.See,also, "Turkish hacker group takes over Religious Affairs website"03,June,2013, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-hacker-group-takes-over-religious-affairs-website.aspx?pageID=238&nid=49934>

they showed Western countries' "true intentions."³⁰ Officially the CHP condemned the ousting of President Morsi, nonetheless there were CHP deputies like Birgöl Ayman Güler, an academic that applauded the military intervention.³¹ As far as Israel and its stance over the Turkish Gaza Flotila MHP, leader Devlet Bahçeli, took the governments side and openly declared that the IDF raid on the Mavi Marmar vessel was an act of aggression, which should be never accepted by the Turkish nation.³² Quite an antithesis with CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, which yet condemned the IDF action but took a more guarded stance over Ankara's dealings with Gaza's ruling authority namely Hamas.

Fetulah Gülen

Moving along with the Padishah's pantheon of his domestic rivals, the next character that opposes him for his own motives, is no other than a religious Islamic figure named Fetulah Gülen. He happens to be the most powerful religious leader in Turkey, even though he lives in self exile in the US. Gülen is the spiritual head of a global network, the Hizmet (service), that is comprised of media outlets, schools and charities. His organization is estimated to be worth over 25 billion dollars, which enables him to proceed with his religious agenda without major obstacles. On top of these characteristics, his authority extends inside Turkeys, police forces ,judicial system and systematically is expanding into other Turkish institutions. Gülen above all is a Turkish imam who considers himself a spiritualist Theologian. As Rachel Sharon-Krespin states he is: "*[A]n enigmatic figure, that many in the West specifically applaud him as a reformist*

³⁰ "Gül urges interim gov't to reinstate democracy, not hurt Morsi", 05,July,2013,Zaman,available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=9EB787DBE886755ABFB691EC65724EA1?newsId=320093&columnistId=0

³¹ Bugum,Burak, "A dangerous voice in the CHP",08,July,2013,Zaman,available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/blogNewsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=320271&columnistId=152

³² Bahçeli: Saldırı Türk milletine açık düşmanlıktır,01June 2010,ntvmsnbc,available at: <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25101640/>

and advocate for tolerance, a catalyst of "moderate Islam" for Turkey and beyond." ³³ In other words his services are rendered as a barrier against the Salafist version of Islam. Especially after the collapse of the USSR, the USA thought that a Turkic religious vision like the one stemming from Gülen's schools if inserted into the newly established Central Asian Republics would be able to prevent Sunni extremism and Iran's expanding influence. Something that Hojafendi and Ankara exploited to the outmost and still utilize for their own grand schemes. On the other hand, for his opponents, Gülen is above all a manipulative man. One that is aspiring for the gradual global dominance of Sunni Islam through a series of conservative steps that imply grand stratagems of capitalism, education and political alliance with the local elite of each targeted state. Dr. Aland Mizell actually gives a better understanding of the above statement with the following statement of his:

*"[G]ülen's followers, like their leader, have several personalities. The first personality, which is the visible one and the one known by the people, is that of a humble, loving and, even more, tolerant spiritual leader. Another personality of the Gülenists is that they desire to have total control and domination using the Machiavellian principles of forging secret plans and establishing political alliances through soft power to pursue his long-term plan of bringing back a Sunni theocratic Ottoman Empire. The third personality of the Gülenists is that they are opportunistic and like to befriend those with the greatest power to gain their own power."*³⁴

Fetulah Hoca's main nucleus that drives his empire is his educational institutions. For him shaping the minds and souls of the youth of Turkey and beyond is of great precedence. Like the

³³ Rachel Sharon-Krespin, "Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition" winter 2009, Vol. XVI, The Middle East Quarterly, available at: <http://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition>

³⁴ Dr. Aland Mizell, "Hudaybiyah and the Great Game: Gülen and the current peace negotiations" 17, January, 2013, Kurdnet, available at: <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/1/turkey4447.htm>

Nazis in the past who placed racial superiority into their youth teachings, and with the Communists similarly investing in Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, Gülen's guidelines combines religion mixed with modern technological endeavors along with an Ottoman grandeur.

According with Rachel Krespin findings, the overt network of his schools is only one part of a larger strategy.³⁵ Because, after all not only he controls 75 percent of Turkey's two million preparatory schools students that are enrolled in his educational establishments but also he is able to steer their minds. More specifically, Mr. Nurettin Veren one of *Gülen's* former associates that used to run his schools for over thirty five years openly claims: "*[T]hese schools are like shop windows. Recruitment and Islamization activities are carried out through night classes. Children whom we educated in Turkey are now in the highest positions. There are governors, judges, military officers. There are ministers in the government. They consult Gülen before doing anything.*"³⁶

On top of the Hizmet's schema, AKP's controversial education agenda, should be added to the grand scheme of the Islamization of Turkish society. More accurately: "*[d]uring AKP's first term in government, the Erdoğan government has changed textbooks, emphasized religious courses, and transferred thousands of certified imams from their positions in the Directorate of Religious Affairs to positions as teachers and administrators in Turkey's public schools.*"³⁷ Turkey's current President, a favorite of Gülen, is actually one of the major characters that gave the *coup de grace* to secular education in Anatolia. He did that by appointing a Hizmet-confidant professor, named Yusuf Ziya Özcan, to direct Turkey's Council of Higher Education

³⁵ Rachel Sharon-Krespin, "Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition", The Middle East Quarterly, available at: <http://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition>

³⁶ Ibid, at: <http://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition>

³⁷ Ibid, at: <http://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition>

(Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK) and by assigning Gülen followers to guide university presidencies.³⁸

However, AKP and the Hizmet movement don't see the world with the same prism as it might seem due to their religious orientations. Erdoğan is a more traditionalist believer and belongs to a different religious order than Gülen which is called the Naksibenti. Followers of this order adhere to the Orthodox Sunni tradition of Islam, and follow the political tradition of the Milli Görüş school. As M. Kemal Kaya explains: "*[M]illi Görüş movement is actually deeply rooted in political Islam and its members pay considerably less attention to the Turkish ethnic bond than to the broader Muslim identity.*"³⁹ Something that can be noticed with Erdoğan's worldly Muslim platform that ranges from the Palestinian issue, to the plight of the Uighurs in China. Former Islamist Prime minister Necmetin Erbakan the founder and leader of quite a few Turkish Islamic political parties from the late 1960s onward, was also member of this belief.. Thus, it is no secret that his protégé Erdoğan follows his tradition. Now on the other side the Gülen movement or Cemaat its main dogma stems from the Nurcu movement of Sheikh Sa'id-i Kurdi (1878-1960), also known as Sa'id-i Nursi, the founder of the Islamist Nur (light) movement.⁴⁰ After all Gülen was a student of his and he adheres his policies that forbade direct involvement in politics on the part of its associates. The reasoning behind as M. Kemal Kaya

³⁸ Ibid.at: <http://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition>

³⁹ M. Kemal Kaya and Svante E. Cornell,"The Big split: The Differences that led Erdogan and the Gulen movement to part ways." 05 March,2012,The Turkey Analyst, vol. 5 no. 5 available at: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120305a.html>

⁴⁰ M. Kemal Kaya and Svante E. Cornell,"The Big split: The Differences that led Erdogan and the Gulen movement to part ways.",The Turkey Analyst, vol. 5 no. 5 available at: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120305a.html>. However, it should be made evident that despite was formerly a well-known Nur-disciple, Gülen : "*[a]voids being identified with the teachings of Said-i Nursi who founded the school; whenever he refers to the teachings of Said-i Nursi, Gulen does not pronounce the name of Nursi. His reluctance lies in the fact that the name Said-i Nursi recalls radicalism and the Kurdish cause*"...Quoted from, "Tarikats and Cemaats in Turkey" 24,January,1997, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/tarikats-and-cemaats-in-turkey.aspx?pageID=438&n=tarikats-and-cemaats-in-turkey-1997-01-24>

states is that: "*[d]irect involvement would create a conflict of interest and weaken the main aim it seeks to instill in its members, known as Imana Hizmet, or "service to the faith."*"⁴¹

Nevertheless, despite their differences, AKP and the Gülenists joined forces against the generals. Long victimized by the Kemalists, the Hizmet was pleased when Erdogan's Justice and Development (AK) party took power in 2002 and despite their differences they joined their forces in a holy alliance against Kemalism. As a direct result of this Fetulah Gülen and his supporters started to purge by any means their opponents by using their newly semi controlled authority in the judicial system and the police security forces.

According to Gareth H. Jenkins: "*[E]rdoğan made no attempt to interfere when the Gülenist-driven judicial cases resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of supporters of the previous secular regime and the intimidation into silence of many thousands more. Although he was sometimes uneasy about the influence of a force he did not control, Erdoğan saw no reason to intervene as long as the cases targeted those who he believed could threaten his own grip on power.*"⁴² Every persona political or not that had moved against Fetulah Gülen in the land of Turkey has met Gulen's wrath. Common civil service employees like ex-police chief Hanefi Avcı and journalists like Ahmet Sik that openly defied him through their work were arrested and spent time in jail. Actually, Hanefi Avcı, a former chief of police in Turkey, wrote a book entitled *Haliç'te Yaşayan Simonlar: Dün Devlet Bugün Cemaat* ["Devotee' Residents of Haliç: Yesterday a State, Today a Religious Congregation"], in which Avcı claimed that the Hizmet movement had infiltrated the police and manipulated key trials such as the Ergenekon trials

⁴¹ Ibid,at: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120305a.html>

⁴² Gareth Jenkins, "Between a rock and a hard place: Turkey's Internal power struggle", 13,february,2013,The Turkey analyst,vol3.no.6, available at: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2013/130213A.html>

through judges and prosecutors close to the movement.⁴³ Ironically, Avcı is a conservative Islamist, himself and once he adhered piously to the Hizmet's rules, also worth mentioning is that his children were all educated in a Gülen school. Shortly after publishing the book, Avcı was arrested and accused of leaking information to the nominally Marxist-Leninist Devrimci Karargah organization. Currently, he has been sentenced to 15 years and three months in prison concerning his association with the ultra-leftist Revolutionary Headquarters terrorist organization. Ahmet Sik a Journalist, has met a similar fate when he tried to publish a book which alleged that the Gülen movement has actually infiltrated Turkey's police force.⁴⁴ Worth also mentioning is the fate of the military ring leaders of the alleged Ergenekon and Balyoz planned coups to remove the AKP from power, along with those responsible for the 1997 February 28, ousting of Prime Minister Erbakan's Islamic government. There are currently 400 serving and retired officers in jail.⁴⁵

These actions alone stipulate that a parallel state with tentacles exists inside the police and the Judiciary, which is a direct threat to the Padishah's authority. Especially now, that their common enemies have begun to fade from the political spectrum. Their demise, unlocked the spirit of competition for the minds and riches of Anatolia. Ironically, despite the fact that

⁴³ Hanefi Avcı, Retrieved,5,august,2013, available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanefi_Avcı%C4%B1. See, also, "Former Turkish police chief Hanefi Avcı arrested",28,Septemebr,2010, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=former-turkish-police-chief-under-custody-2010-09-28>. See, also, "Former Police chief Avcı sentenced to 15 years on terror charges",19,July,2013,Zaman,available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-321336-former-police-chief-avci-sentenced-to-15-years-on-terror-charges.html>.See,also, "Police Chief's New Book Claims Religious Organization Infiltrates Government", 22,August,2010, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=chief-of-police-publishes-book-with-claims-of-religious-organization-infiltrating-the-government-2010-08-22>

⁴⁴ Jürgen Gottschlich, "The Imam's Army": Arrested Journalist's Book Claims Turkish Police Infiltrated by Islamic Movement",07,april,2011, *Spiegel*, available at: "The Imam's Army": Arrested Journalist's Book Claims Turkish Police Infiltrated by Islamic Movement

⁴⁵ " Turkish court returns verdicts over Ergenekon plot against government",05,August,2013, The Guardian, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/turkish-court-verdicts-ergenekon-plot>. See, also, "Turkey arrests more officers over 1997 coup",19,April,2012, Reuters, available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/19/us-turkey-military-arrests-idUSBRE83I0SN20120419>

Fetullah Gülen and the Padishah share the same objective of the total Sunnification of Anatolia and an overall dominance in the Sunni regions of the Middle East and beyond, they still have two major differences. First is who will have the overall authority of this Ottoman project and secondly with what pace it should become a reality. Gülen doesn't like to see Dr. Hakan Fidan being groomed as the possible next Padishah of Anatolia and secondly he is concerned with Erdogan's current stratagems in the Levant and the Middle East. Even though he shares the end he doesn't accept the current means of how Erdoğan is attempting to achieve this. He is mainly alarmed with the fact of openly challenging Israel's authority and policies in the Levant that could endanger the grand scheme. Hence, patience and a methodical long term plan is a must. Fetullah Gülen adheres that only when you are ready and only then, should you show your real face.⁴⁶

For Gülen Turkey is not yet ready to step in the arena with the great powers and compete openly. After all, his Nur (light) ideology demands patience. Paradoxically many media and politicians in the west have praised his antithesis with the Gezi park protesters treatment by the AKP administration. However, as Dr Rubin states that might not be the real case with Gülen because : *"[G]ülen has such active influence among the security forces, the police behavior*

⁴⁶ Gülen's following statements from televised sermons in Turkey that were aired in public TV should be enough even for those who have doubts about his long envisaged plans inside and outside Anatolia. More precisely in the sermons he declared: *"[Y]ou must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers ... until the conditions are ripe, they [the followers] must continue like this. If they do something prematurely, the world will crush our heads, and Muslims will suffer everywhere, like in the tragedies in Algeria, like in 1982 [in] Syria ... like in the yearly disasters and tragedies in Egypt. The time is not yet right. You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it ... You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institutions in Turkey"* ... Quoted from, Rachel Sharon-Krespin, "Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition ", The Middle East Quarterly, available at: <http://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition>

*probably reflects more upon the real Gülen than all of those shadow organizations who continue to sing his praises as a man of peace."*⁴⁷

It is no secret that Hizmet's owned newspapers like Zaman are openly criticizing Dr. Hakan Fidans proceedings with the PKK along with full commentaries, wishing to see President Abdullah Gul as the next successor of Erdoğan's place.⁴⁸ After all Gul is one of Gülen 's favorite politicians, his presidential degrees concerning education are there to prove it. Currently Gul's leadership and achievements is over publicized by Gülen's Media and even by some Secular ones. He is portrayed as a moderate that the west can deal with on issues that range from Egypt, Israel and even in internal Turkish problems like the Alevi. In other words, Gul can become again, the party's face on Turkey for Westerners. However, the major danger that Gülen faces is that an uncontrolled demise of Erdoğan might bring his old secular nemesis back into power once more. Therefore, the *Padishah* and Gülen will share the same future if Kemalism has a victorious comeback. In other words if this confrontational atmosphere persists and there is no *Modus Vivendi* between these too Islamic factions the outcome will be: *a lose-lose for both*. This fact alone, stipulates a cease fire of enmities in the near future among those two religious camps, thus allowing the *Padishah* to have the upper hand in this relationship at the moment.

Now regarding foreign policy issues as in the case of the Mavi Marmara flotilla, Gülen stated his disapproval of the flotilla initiative: "[t]erming it a 'defying of authority' for failing to seek Israeli approval for its delivery of aid."⁴⁹ His reasoning behind his statement rests on the

⁴⁷ Michael Rubin, "What do the Turkey protests say about Fethullah Gülen?" 5 June, 2013, American Enterprise Institute, available at: <http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/06/what-do-turkey-protests-say-about-fethullah-gulen/>

⁴⁸ İhsan Yılmaz, "AKP, Erdoğan, Gül and 2014", 19 July, 2013, Zaman, available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-321362-akp-erdogan-gul-and-2014.html>

⁴⁹ M. Kemal Kaya and Svante E. Cornell, "The Big split: The Differences that led Erdogan and the Gulen movement to part ways.", available at: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120305a>.

fact that Turkey is not ready to openly confront the West. He knows that behind Israel stands the US, where he also has built an extensive net of business and political support that he hates to lose because of challenging the west.

Concerning Syria, Gülen is silently supporting the Sunni resurgence against Bashir Al-Assad Alawite regime. Fırat news had openly claimed that Kurdish students from Hizmet schools in Turkey were recruited by the Al Nusra an Al Qaida affiliated group to fight against the Alawite forces of Bassar-Assad. Al-Nusra intends to topple Bashar al-Assad and to transform Syria into a Sunni Islamist state. For that purpose, they fight against both Hezbollah and the PYD. Ironically, however they were sent to fight their own brothers the Kurdish Democratic Union Party PYD and they were captured.⁵⁰ According to Fıratnews, recruiting became a reality through the aid of the Hizmet teachers and MIT's assistance to keep the Sunni resistance in Syria alive.⁵¹ After all, not all recruits were Kurds, but Sunnis from Anatolia and abroad that were manipulated for a greater cause. An issue that many nations around Turkey have become aware of and are looking on ways how to combat it.

In a similar fashion Hojafenti adopted Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attitude visà-vis the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi by Egypt's armed forces. Fetulah Gülen openly affirmed that:

"[t]he ouster of this administration through a coup similar to those in

⁵⁰ Sedat Sur, "Cemaatin tezgahıyla El Nusra'ya eleman desteği",27,July,2013, Fıratnews.com, available at: <http://www.firatnews.com/news/guncel/cemaatin-tezgahıyla-el-nusra-ya-eleman-destegi.htm>

⁵¹ Turkish Intelligence (MIT) supportive position in transportation and logistical matters to Al Nusras aims in Syria became evident , when three Tunisian Al Nusra recruits caught by Kurdish PYD(Democratic Union Party) forces in the city of Efrin Asayishi admitted the latter's role into their war efforts. More precisely prisoners, Nadir Elwassani, Essabi Musa, and Yusuf Ekkari spoke about an operational team of Turkish officers codenamed IMAM that aids Al Nusra in logistical and transportation matters against PYD and Syria's armed forces. For more info on Turkey's supportive role to Al Qaida allies See, Seyit evran, Türkiye'den El Kaide'ye tam destek, 12July,2013,Fıratnews.com, available at: <http://firatnews.org/news/guncel/turkiye-den-el-kaide-ye-tam-destek.htm>

Turkey on May 27, 1960, March 12, 1971, and Sept. 12, 1980,

will go down in history as “evilness.” “Democracy has been once again

*dealt a blow.*⁵²

For Hizmet along with Ankara, President's Morsi's ousting signifies a serious loss not only in religious terms but also in geopolitical terms. A connecting link with the land of North Africa was cut thus Egypt which was viewed as a stepping zone into the rest of Africa is no more feasible.⁵³

Last but not least his influence is starting to penetrate Greece's Muslim minority in Western Thrace. Greek Intelligence services have been alarmed concerning Gülen's religious activities in Western Thrace an area that borders Turkey. During a recent raid by Hellenic security forces in the prefecture of Xanthi, a radical Gülenist Muslim preacher was arrested with charges that he is teaching Jihadism and inciting hate against the state and the West.⁵⁴ In particularly two religious schools under his auspices have been constructed in northern Greece foretelling what might follow in Western Thrace in the near future. Above all Gülen's activities

⁵² "Gülen: Democracy dealt yet another blow in Egypt", 09,July,2013, Zaman ,available at:

<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-320354-gulen-democracy-dealt-yet-another-blow-in-egypt.html>

⁵³ Turkey has invested allot in Sudan, especially in agricultural projects, oil exploration, mining and in a genetic resources center in Khartoum A cooperation that the West and Israel vigilantly follow specifically when it comes to Genetically engineering ventures. Ones that could have severe implications for international peace and security because they can be easily manipulated if left unchecked to open up tremendous avenues for the creation of new and enhanced biological weapons. See, "Turkish ministers inaugurate genetic resources center in Sudan",24,February,2013, World Bulletin, available at: <http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=103800>. See, also, "Sudan, Turkey sign mining, oil and power deals", 27,May,2013,Mineweb.com, available at: <http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/content/en//mineweb-mining-finance-investment?oid=191547&sn=Detail>. See, also, "Turkey to Invest 300 Mln in Agriculture in Sudan,"07 July,2013, SudanSafari, available at http://english.sudansafari.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4682:turkey-to-invest-300mln-in-agriculture-in-sudan&catid=6:slid&Itemid=6: See, also, Abdullah Bozkurt, "Sudan and South Sudan: indispensable partners for Turkey",24,december,2012,Zaman,available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-302064-sudan-and-south-sudan-indispensable-partners-for-turkey.html>

⁵⁴ "Η τρομοκρατική ισλαμιστική οργάνωση του Γκιουλέν, που έχει "φίλους" και στην Ελλάδα, συνεργάζεται με την Αλ Κάιντα στη Συρία," 07,25,2013, Infognomon.com,available at: http://infognomonpolitics.blogspot.gr/2013/07/h_23.html. See, also, Παραδίδουν τη Θράκη στα χέρια του Ισλάμ και σε μουλάδες που διδάσκουν τζιχάντ. 25,July,2013,Kostasxan,available at: http://kostasxan.blogspot.gr/2013/07/blog-post_4423.html

in Thrace signify a collaboration with the Turkish foreign policy aims in the Balkans, that aspire for a Balkan caliphate, a stepping stone for uniting with mother Turkey. A policy that sides perfectly with AKP's Neo Ottoman diplomacy for the Balkan region as a whole.

Kurdish Nationalism

From all his political enemies, the one that the *Padishah* fears most, and can derail his long term plans for Turkey is the Kurdish people and their national aspirations. Besides a real downturn of the Turkish economy the only way to weaken Erdoğan's, administration that won 50 percent of the national vote, at a time when the Army and his secular enemies are under his spell, is to ensure a sabotage or an annulment of the negotiations between the PKK Kurdish separatist movement and MIT's Dr. Hakan Fidan's peace negotiations.

The following statement by Prime Minister Erdoğan during his visit in Bingol an eastern province of Turkey immediately after the Gezi protests in Istanbul articulates his thoughts:

"[E]ven if it is not at the pace that we want, even if sabotage and provocations occur, we are carrying out the responsibility that lies upon us," he said."⁵⁵

Above all Prime Minister Erdoğan recognizes that if the nonstop harassment of the Turkish Armed forces by PKK's guerilla warfare tactics continues and with no clear victory at hand, it might cause an intensification of Turkish Nationalist instincts that could depose or weaken his administration. Ironically, however even the possible downfall of Ankara's current government will not solve the Kurdish issue either. Clearly pointing out that Ankara and the Kurds are currently under a fragile alliance for their own reasons.

⁵⁵ "Police to replace private security in public universities: Turkish PM", 12, July, 2013, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-to-replace-private-security-in-public-universities-turkish-pm.aspx?pageID=238&nID=50625&NewsCatID=338>

The *Padishah* needs the PKK's political wing support that is represented in the Turkish legislature, with BDP party, the political branch that represents the Kurdish aspirations in order to pass his constitutional changes that eventually will lead him to Turkey's Presidency. The latter however holds the ace of spades and is up to PKK how they will use it. Either it will acquire the power to have a real say into Turkish Politics or it will get trapped its own people's civil strife's curse. A recipe well used by Ankara and the surrounding countries that hold a substantial Kurdish populace in their interior, were the word independence or autonomy is an anathema. Even Northern Iraqi Kurdistan, the de facto ruler Barzani is not very happy with a powerful Kurdish movement inside Turkey and neighboring civil strife worn Syria that could potentially threaten his Kurdish state's legitimacy in the region.⁵⁶

Finally, Prime Minister Erdoğan is using his Islamic political platform to unite the Kurds under Sunni Islam and not on nationalist cultural boundaries. A reason why many in the PKK fear Ankara's long range strategy of pacifying the Kurdish issue through religion and economic prosperity which might become a viable possibility. Ironically however, his rival, Fetulah Gülen doesn't see the PKK -MIT peace process with the same eye as Erdoğan. A paradox by itself since Sunni Islam as a unifying force that should been enough for the Hizmet movement to become an advent supporter of latter's peace process. Nonetheless, the movement has not yet decided its inclination and time will tell if it will join the AKP forces on this issue or it will hide under a nationalistic veil like its previous secular opponents.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Denise Natali, "PKK Challenges Barzani In Iraqi Kurdistan ", 09,May,2013, Al-monitor, available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/pkk-barzani-challenge-kurdistan.html>. See, also, Kamal Chomani, "Ocalan v. Barzani: Two contradictory worlds",11,May,2013, kurdistantribune.com,available at: <http://kurdistantribune.com/2013/ocalan-v-barzani-two-contradictory-worlds/>

⁵⁷ M. Kemal Kaya and Svante E. Cornell,"The Big split: The Differences that led Erdogan and the Gulen movement to part ways.", available at: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120305a>

The Hizmet (service) movement after all has witnessed many attacks, literally and physically on its Islamic schools and institutions in the Southeastern part of Anatolia by the local populace that is friendly to PKK. Not to mention the Kurdish diasporas objection of Hizmet's presence in Kurdistan, on the grounds of Sunnism versus Alevism which a substantial Kurdish minority holds as its religious affiliation.⁵⁸ Overall, however, Peace in the South East will also bring a reorganization of the Turkey's military strategic doctrine and ease the economic costs of fighting a protracted guerilla war. A possibility that might bring chills to Ankara's regional adversaries, especially for economically strapped Greece.

In lieu of Conclusion

Overall in his internal political front Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan still has the upper hand, and as many Turkish analysts have openly affirmed the *Padishah: "[s]till has his chances of being elected president under the current system in 2014"*.⁵⁹ However, recent events have also confirmed that after the Taksim Park protests, Erdoğan has been vindictive and repressive, thus signifying a new era of political uncertainty that could have also international repercussions in the international arena.

Even so a new key player is slowly but methodically entering the Turkish political arena. As previously mentioned, this is an individual that presently the Turkish Prime Minister cannot do without his loyalty, for security and for political reasons. He is the maker of many of Erdoğan's internal and external policies. This individual is the Turkish Intelligence Chief, Dr

⁵⁸ PKK seeks to broaden political appeal as settlement process drags, 10 July, 2013, Zaman, available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-320529-.html>

⁵⁹ Gareth Jenkins, Erdoğan, the AKP and the Repercussions of the Gezi Park Protests, 05 July, 2013, The Turkey Analyst, vol. 6 no. 13, available at: <http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/49-erdogan-the-akp-and-the-repercussions-of-the-gezi-park-protests.html>

Hakan Fidan. An ambitious, and well versed Machiavellian personality that soon the Middle East and the Levant will have to know and deal with, if not already.

Concurring with Murat Yelkin when he openly states: "*[W]e are observing a situation in which domestic and international politics, and Turkey's internal and external security, are intermingling terribly.*"⁶⁰

RIEAS Publications

RIEAS welcomes short commentaries from young researchers/analysts for our web site (**about 700 words**), but we are also willing to consider publishing short papers (**about 5000 words**) in the English language as part of our publication policy. The topics that we are interested in are: transatlantic relations, intelligence studies, Mediterranean and Balkan issues, Middle East Affairs, European and NATO security, Greek foreign and defence policy as well as Russian Politics and Turkish domestic politics. Please visit: www.rieas.gr (**Publication Link**).

ISSN: 2241-6358

⁶⁰ Murat Yetkin, "Syria war at the gates of Turkey", 18, July, 2013, Hurriyetdailynews, available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/syria-war-at-the-gates-of-turkey.aspx?pageID=449&nID=50927&NewsCatID=409>.