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BIS (CZECH COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SERVICE)
IN TRANSFORMATION 1994-2014

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Abstract
This paper is designed to select the BIS 1994-2004 (the Czech Security and Intelligence Service) to answer three research questions: 1. what is change and difference of the BIS intelligence policy? 2. what motive and purpose of the BIS organisational reconstruction? 3. what major mission/operation assign to the BIS, what mission is successful and what failure the BIS needs to overcome? This paper applies the organisational culture to be research concept to study the BIS organisational transformation, and uses the policy analysis and mission analysis to be research method to analyse the BIS in policy transformation and mission/operation transformation. This paper concludes that the BIS organisational transformation connected with political regime, and the BIS policy transformation refers to democratic constitution and law, and the BIS mission/operation transformation relates to outer and inner audit, control and inspection supervised by parliament and governmental organisations.
Introduction

This article selects the Czech Security Intelligence Service (Bezpečnostní Informační Služba) to analyse by reason of case significance — the BIS represents the decisive and central position in the Czech intelligence community (Czech intelligence community consists of Bezpečnostní Informační Služba--Security Intelligence Service, Úřad Pro Zahraniční Styky a Informace --Office for Foreign Relations and Information, and Vojenské Zpravodajství --the Czech Military Intelligence, and Národní Bezpečnostní úřad --National Security Office), and what the BIS act or react will shape the Czech intelligence community, and influence national security and intelligence policy of the Czech government.

This paper focuses on the BIS transformation from 1994 to 2014. This paper eyes on three major parts of the BIS transformation-- policy, organisation, and operation/mission. Refer to the BIS intelligence policy, this research policy analysis method to analyse. Policy analysis requires careful systematic and empirical study, and it focuses on all aspects of the policy process, from the early stages of policy adoption and formulation to the implementation and evaluation of public policies. (Simon, 2007:686). Policy analysis is a method of inquiry to examine governmental activity that provides a systematic way to assess the consequences of past policy actions and the alternatives available to address societal problems. (Policy Analysis, 2011:1219)

Associated with the BIS organisation, this paper applies organisational culture to analyse transformation of the BIS organisation. Organisational culture formed from the beliefs, behavioural norms and values of its workforce and it is embodied in the structures, processes and strategies of the organisation. (Jeffs, 2008:69). In addition, this paper adopts mission analysis to study the BIS mission/operation. Mission Analysis is the process by which the operating plan and contingency plans are developed. It includes organising the team to meet the mission objectives, allocating resources to perform the critical tasks, and monitoring the team and the environment to adjust resources as

In connection with BIS policy, organisation, and mission/operation transformation, this study is designed to answer these major research questions:

1. What is change and difference of the BIS intelligence policy?
2. What motive and purpose of the BIS organisational reconstruction?
3. What major mission/operation assign to the BIS, what mission is successful and what failure the BIS needs to overcome?

**BIS in policy transformation**

Since the BIS was established on 30th July 1994, this Czech intelligence service has tackled many policy, organisation, and mission/operation challenge. During the Soviet and early stage of Czechoslovakia Republic, the Czech intelligence experienced less accountability and transparency, and it is uneasy to study the Czech intelligence policy. However, democracy and liberty reshape Czech Republic, and the Czech intelligence keeps more transparent. The BIS plays decisive role in the Czech intelligence community, and the BIS action and reaction impact on the Czech intelligence policy-making and decision-making for the Czech prime minister and president. The first chief of the BIS was Stanislav Devatý (July 1994–February 1997) who was a lawyer, political dissident, a significant signatory for the Charter 77 (Charta 77).

Stanislav Devatý rebuilt separation of the Czechoslovakia intelligence service to construct the BIS, but he suffered a few political scandal about illegal surveillance of Czech politicians and political parties. Apparently, Stanislav Devatý left the BIS chief position rather than gave explanation in political scandal. Stanislav Devatý played as fire fighter for Czech intelligence service, because this agency witnessed dissolution of Czechoslovakia Republic, and his mission was assigned to stabilise the Czech intelligence. During Stanislav Devatý leadership, the Czech intelligence service distanced away from totalitarian style operation, but adopted democratic system.

After Stanislav Devatý's resignation, Karel Vuterin (1997–1999) became successor to design blueprint to modernise the BIS. Karel Vuterin voiced more transparency of the BIS, and struggled for more public support, and he set up an internal commission with
the mission to prepare a blueprint for a restructuring of the BIS. Karel Vulterin also vowed to make the BIS more transparent to the public, particularly he appointed the first BIS spokesperson, and led the way for the release of the first BIS public report (BIS výroční zpráva) on its activities. (Lefebvre, 2011:702-703).

The BIS first report was issued on 1st June 1998 to provide deep threat-and-crisis analysis about Czech republic, and the BIS annual report becomes one important activity to explain the Czech intelligence policy to the public. In accordance with policy analysis method, this paper outlines the Czech intelligence transformation in these scopes and perspectives:

- policy action

The BIS annual reports explain policy action each year, and the Table 1 outlines different priorities. Apparently, the BIS transformed its nature from totalitarian to democratic regime, and the BIS is compulsory to abide by law and protect democracy in the beginning. Since 2001, the BIS has been in internationalisation to seek for more intelligence co-operation and co-ordination with foreign intelligence services and the intelligence units of international organisations. Since 2003, the Czech citizens and politicians criticised the BIS illegal clandestine operation, and they were worried the BIS to violate fundamental human rights.

Since 2008, the BIS improves accountability and transparency to earn more support from Czech citizens and politicians, and make them believe what the BIS plan to do is legal action, and the BIS strengthens inner audit and inspection in order to strike illegal clandestine operation that might violate fundamental human rights. Since 2011, the BIS concerns more about weapon proliferation and control, and the BIS has achieved to control illegal weapon sale with several international arms control groups, such like Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Zangger Committee (ZC), Australia Group (AG), the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Haague Code of Conduct (HCoC), and so on. (BIS, 2011)
### Table 1 the Czech intelligence policy action in the BIS annual reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>POLICY ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996 -1997</td>
<td>Democratisation, NATO participation, decrease StB affiliation (Státní bezpečnost, the Communist Czech secret police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>Legalisation of intelligence operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Co-operation with foreign intelligence service with permission of the Czech government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Prague NATO Summit (BIS, NATO intelligence uni, and NATO member states intelligence co-operation and co-ordination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Transparency of clandestine operation, EU member intelligence co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Advanced data-gathering technique and skill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Inner audit and inspection, cyber security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>International nuclear and arm control regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Weapon proliferation control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BIS výroční zpráva 1996-2012   Analysis: CHENG, Yu-Chin

- evaluation

Generally speaking, abiding by law, inner audit and inspection (Vnitřní kontrola) are most important for the Czech intelligence policy evaluation. Even though the Czech intelligence community, supports democracy, and enhances transparency, the Czech citizens and politicians distrust this intelligence community by reason of clandestine operation scandals. The inspection section (orgán inspekce), the inner audit section (orgán interního auditu), and the inner security section (orgán vnitřní bezpečnosti) are responsible for the Czech intelligence community inner safety issues. The Czech intelligence community evaluate own intelligence policy with legality of policy action.
and operative activity, especially most politicians and citizens concern whether intelligence officer operate mission against them. (Pokorný, 2013:2-3)

The BIS establishes the inner security system (vnitřní bezpečnosti system) to evaluate own intelligence policy, and this system co-operates with other Czech police and intelligence units to control and evaluate the BIS intelligence policy and operation. (BIS, 1998). The inner security system targets these subjects to evaluate the BIS intelligence policy:

1. Legality of missions and operations
2. National interest protection
3. Budget planning and execution

Furthermore, the BIS undergoes supervision of the Czech Parliament (Parlamentní kontrola činnosti BIS) and the Czech government (kontrola vlády) in accordance with Act No. 153 of July 7th, 1994 on the Intelligence Services of the Czech Republic (zákona č. 153/1994 Sb.,o zpravodajských službách České republiky). The Czech Parliament creates the special control committee (zvláštní kontrolní orgán) to invite 7 parliamentary members to investigate the BIS intelligence policy and activities. The BIS chief is requested to report and brief to the special control committee, and is compulsory to answer these inquires:

1. the BIS development
2. the BIS budget
3. the BIS assignment given by the Czech government or President
4. the BIS operation and mission

The BIS in policy transformation can be outlined throughout the inner security system, and the inner audit system. The BIS is in crossroad of transformation, and accumulates lessons to learn democratisation and legality, particularly the BIS has suffered several scandals of civil rights violation. In accordance with Table 2, the BIS struggled for institutional transition and adoption until 2000, and the BIS actified data protection, crisis management and emergency response until 2010. The BIS endeavours police mission, property, and expenditure-and-budget inspections, and the BIS audits own officers safety and case security well. (Pokorný, L., 2013).
Besides the parliamentary control and the BIS inner audit and inspection, the Czech government established the the General Inspectorate of Security Services (GIBS) (Zákon č. 341/2011 Sb. - o Generální inspekcii bezpečnostních sborů a o změně souvisejících zákonů) to prevent every Czech police and security agency from power abusing and corruption. The most importance for the GIBS is to stop any violation of human rights coming from any Czech security and police agency.

**Table 2 the BIS audit and inner inspection within the inner security system**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>AUDIT AND INNER INSPECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996 -1997</td>
<td>counter-espionage and conspiracy, budget execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>the BIS police mission, irregular activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Approval of CO-4-2 and CO-6-1 to monitor weapon, Y2K problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>illegal BIS staff activity, data protection and classification, crisis management (war prevention and military crisis/conflict solution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>the BIS administration, the BIS police mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>the BIS information system (function, implementation, relocation, classified information protection), fulfillment of the Czech National Security Council information system certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>the Czech EU Presidency, the BIS information system (function, implementation, relocation, classified information protection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Regular training of crisis management, personal safety protection, and the BIS information system (function, implementation, relocation, classified information protection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>the BIS Inner Audit System (Vnitřní kontrolní systém), the BIS staff profession, civil rights violation inspection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>the BIS expenditure inspection and budget planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>the BIS property inspection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BIS výroční zpráva 1996-2012  
Analysis: CHENG, Yu-Chin
**BIS in organisational transformation**

The BIS stems from the Czech secret police—StB (*Státní tajná Bezpečnost*) is in charge of domestic security and counter-intelligence activities. The StB was totalitarian, but the BIS appears democratic. Zetocha (2005) analyses, “the BIS experience problematic issues and debate on organisational transformation, because the BIS must remove nature and spirit of the Czech secret police in the communist ear, and diverts itself into democratisation”. (2005: 436-437).

Pachta and Riháčková (2009) concludes, “co-ordination is the main task to reinforce the BIS to process organisational transformation. Less personnel effectiveness and management is another main issue to drive the BIS organisational transformation. At last but not least, weakness of the Czech Parliament oversight and supervision makes the BIS organisational transformation unmanageable.” (2009: 108-109).

Zetocha analyses (2008), “reform of the Czech intelligence service eyes on democracy regime control....particularly this reform is connected with political transition for democracy.” (2008: 16-17) Table 3 summaries several priorities of the BIS organisational transformation, and this proves Zetocha's analysis. After collapse of the Soviet regime, the Czech intelligence community was reconstructed simultaneously, and the Czech Republic planned to eliminate the Czech secret police and establish the Federal Security Information Service (*Federální bezpečnostní informační služba*, FBIS) in connection with democratic constitution and law, and inner inspection system. (Zetocha, 2005: 440).

Unlike the Czech secret police, the Federal Security Information Service was requested for transparency and accountability, audit and inspection by the Czech citizens and Parliament, and all intelligence operation and organisation establish on the basis of constitution and law. When the Velvet Divorce (*sametový rozvod*) separated the Czechoslovakia, the BIS, entitled with the Czech Republic, reshaped this agency. The Velvet Divorce shocked the FBIS, because these former cooperators become current competitors, and the Slovak and the Czech intelligence service drop intro relationship on the horns of dilemma. On 30th July 1994, the Czech Republic adopted the Act 154/1994 Czech Security Intelligence Service (č. 154/1994 Sb.Zákon o bezpečnostní informační službě) to lead the BIS organisational transformation.
Table 3 the BIS organisational transformation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Úřad pro ochranu ústavy a demokracie Federálního ministerstva vnitra)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Intelligence Service (Bezpečnostní informační služba)</td>
<td>30. 7. 1994 – present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusively speaking, In 1990s, the BIS organisational transformation refers to three fields:

- *Regime: From Communism to Democracy*
- *Separation into the Czech and Slovak intelligence service*
- *Transparency: From policy to action*
- *Prevention: From constitution to terrorism*
- *Combination of law enforcement and intelligence operation*

After 2000, the BIS organisational transformation affiliates with functional transformation in organisation. For example, the BIS is not just only responsible for intelligence operation, and this agency starts to operate police mission, even though the BIS has no privilege of police authority. In Czech intelligence community, the inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination exist problematic issues and bureaucracy, and the BIS connects with police and intelligence operation on the purpose of criminal activities elimination and overcomes bureaucracy.

**BIS in mission/operation transformation**

In order to distinguish mission/operation and organisational transformation, this section focuses on several laws related to the BIS, the BIS Annual Report, and the Parliamentary Oversight for the BIS to analyse the BIS mission/operation transformation. First of all, this sections reviews the BIS predecessor's mission/operation until 1989. In the Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic, the Ministry of Interior shoulders major intelligence and security mission and operations, and the responsible agencies are National Security Corps (Sbor národní bezpečnosti) and Secret Police (Státní bezpečnosti), and these two agencies were in charge of these mission/operations:

- Protection of the the Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic regime.
- Organise and co-ordinate intelligence, counter-espionage, and security activities.
• Prevention of foreign country threat to the Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic's politics, economy, military, and technology.
• Surveillance and reconnaissance of hostility immigrants and ideologies.
• Crisis and emergency management, especially national catastrophe.
• Discrimination elimination, protection and promotion of socialism and communism.
• Organise, co-ordinate, and assign oversea mission, such like Japan, the United States, and NATO.

After the Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic collapsed, the Czechoslovakia Republic established the Constitution and Democracy Protection Agency, Ministry of Interior to continue intelligence and security mission/operation.

The Constitution and Democracy Protection Agency, Ministry of Interior was designed to protect political regime transition, and focused on domestic political, societal, and economic development and stability. Furthermore, the Constitution and Democracy Protection Agency and the successor, the Federal Information Service, Ministry of Interior, terminated intelligence, security, and espionage missions and operations, such as ZÁBRANA (data protection), KABINA (PC system), GOLEM (encryption), ALKA (encryption), DIPLOMAT (encryption), SITNO (encryption), VÍTKOV (encryption), ANTONÍN (data gathering) a JEZERO (data collection) authorised by the Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic. (Poslanecká sněmovna, 1991).

The Constitution and Democracy Protection Agency ends these missions and operations, because they were not allowed in the democratic regime, particularly the democratic authority applied constitution and law to supervise, audit, and control intelligence and security missions and operations. However, the Federal Information Service, Ministry of Interior, was ready for organisational and institutional separation into the Czech and the Slovak intelligence service.

With more stability of new democratic regime divided from the Czechoslovakia Federation, the Security Information Service, Czech Republic, planned more missions and operations related to political and economic interest and stability. In particular, the Security Information Service, Czech Republic organised more lectures and training to strengthen own intelligence officer's identity, because they need to adjust themselves to
treat their old Slovakian partners. Consequently, the Security Information Service, Czech Republic re-designed missions and operations to prevent the Slovak intelligence service to penetrate. After one and half year, the BIS was confident to consolidate officer's identity, and this agency prepared to reshape own structure, mission, and operation.

On 1st August 1994, the BIS removed the name of Czech Republic by reason of successful identity reconstruction, and this agency started normalisation and profession of mission and mission. As stated in the Act 154/1994 Czech Security Intelligence Service (the BIS Act), and the BIS Annual Report, this agency outlines several mission and operation to achieve:

Table 4 the BIS mission/operation transformation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MISSION/OPERATION TRANSFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>1. Democratic regime Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Foreign intelligence operation in Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. National interest protection</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Counter-terrorism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5. Organised Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Co-ordination and co-operation with NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>1. Inter-agency intelligence sharing with the Czech government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Intelligence protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1. Counter extremism, anarchism, and radical activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Counter-espionage and intelligence, such like Russia, Belarus, Serbia, and North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Protection of intelligence and information system and technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Improvement of Co-ordination and co-operation with NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Prevention threat to economic transformation, privatisation, banking sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Protection criteria for EU membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Surveillance and reconnaissance of dual usage materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Counter chemical, nuclear and mass destructive weapon proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Strike organised crime, such like Vietnam, China, Russia, Albania, former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Counter-terrorism (domestic and international)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1. Counter extremism, anarchism, and radical activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2002 | 1. Counter extremism, anarchism, and radical activities  
2. Counter-espionage and intelligence, such like Russia, Iran, and Iraq  
3. Prevention threat to economic transformation, privatisation, banking sectors, and unemployment monitoring  
4. military technology and material export monitoring  
5. Counter chemical, nuclear and mass destructive weapon proliferation  
6. Strike organised crime, Vietnam, China, Russia, Albania, former Yugoslavia, and some Arabic communities in Czech  
7. Human-trafficking and illegal immigration  
8. Counter terrorism, 911 Terrorist Attack monitoring  
9. data protection and promote international intelligence processing |
| 2003 | 1. Counter extremism, anarchism, and radical activities  
2. Counter-human-trafficking and illegal immigration, and co-operate with boarder police unit to monitor visa application |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2004 | 1. Broaden international intelligence co-operation (79 services from 49 countries in touch, regular exchange intelligence with 54 services from 37 countries)  
2. Co-operate with NATO and the EU to counter international terrorism  
3. Trojka--NATO Presidency in intelligence co-operation |
| 2005 | 1. Co-operate with Nuclear Safety Agency (Státní úřad pro jadernou bezpečnost) and Czech Mining Agency (Český báňský úřad) to maintain nuclear security  
2. Co-operate with the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG) |
| 2006 | 1. Co-operate anti-corruption campaign with Ministry of Interior  
2. Co-operate with Office for Foreign Relations and Information (Úřad pro zahraniční styky a informace)  
3. Co-operate with the Czech Military Intelligence Agency (Zpravodajská služba)  
4. Co-operate with Czech police  
5. Co-operate with Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Immigration Agency |
| 2007 | 1. Co-operate with the Unit for Combating Organised Crime of the Criminal Police and Investigation Police, Czech Republic (Útvar pro odhalování organizačaného zločinu Služby kriminální policie a vyšetřování Policie, České republiky)  
2. Co-operate with the Directorate of Alien and Border Police (Ředitelství Služby cizinecké a pohraniční policie) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Missions and Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2008 | 1. Broaden international intelligence co-operation (94 services from 60 countries)  
2. Strengthen counter-terrorism co-operation with NATO and the EU |
| 2009 | 1. Intelligence bilateral co-operation in technology, information, and infrastructure, criminality between the BIS, the FBI (U.S.A.) and the CIA (U.S.A.)  
2. The Prague EU Presidency in counter-terrorism |
| 2010 | 1. Co-operate with Ministry of Foreign Affairs to monitor accreditation for diplomat and journalist  
2. Co-operate with the Czech National Security Council (NBÚ)  
3. Co-operate with the Czech Central Bank for banking sector  
4. Co-operate with the North Atlantic Council for intelligence reform |
| 2011 | 1. Co-operate with the Czech Railway Infrastructure Administration (Správa železniční dopravní cesty)  
2. Co-operate with the Czech Administration of State Material Reserves  
3. Investigate Czech Forestry lobbying case  
4. Monitoring energy security  
5. Monitoring Czech state companies, such like Czech Airline, Czech Rail Way, Czech Post, Czech Cargo  
6. Anti-corruption |
| 2012 | 1. Monitoring cyber security |

Source: BIS výroční zpráva 1996-2012  
Analysis: CHENG, Yu-Chin

Table 2, 3, and 4 concludes the BIS major missions and operations:

- Protection democratic regime and law system
- Protection of national economic interest
- Monitoring foreign intelligence service activity in the Czech territory
- Counter-espionage and intelligence
• Data protection and distribution for Czech governmental organisations
• Counter organised crime and campaign against terrorism
• International intelligence co-operation with IOs (international organisations) and foreign security services.

Besides above-mentioned missions and operations, the BIS was assigned to operate various activities, and this reflects to political and economic environment change impacting on the BIS. During 1990s, the BIS launched several campaigns to get rid of the Soviet influence inside this agency. Since 2000, the BIS has been active to global, regional, bilateral, and multilateral intelligence collaboration and co-ordination to strengthen participation in world intelligence community. Furthermore, the BIS learns to manage new threat and crisis, such like energy security, cyber safety and security problem. Particularly, cyber safety and security is vital but sensitive problem for the BIS, because many countries quarrel over invisible sovereignty for years under shortage of solution.

**Conclusion**

In 1990s, several Czech prime ministers had less attention on the BIS, because they prefer media reporting rather than national intelligence service. These prime ministers felt nonsense of the BIS existence. (Lefebvre, 2011: 695-696). Nonetheless, the Czech Presidents and prime minister value much about the BIS, because the Czech Republic has been in transformation of government and country, and these politicians and bureaucrats desire of intelligence sharing to manage more and more complexity of domestic and international affairs. Additionally, more and more international enterprises and governmental institutions station in the Czech Republic, and the geographic advantage reinforce this country to think, act and decide strategically to manage domestic and foreign affairs.

This paper concludes the BIS in policy, organisational and mission/operation transformation are activated with internationalisation and legalisation. Unlike the Soviet regime, Privilege and obligation are relevant in the democracy for the BIS. The BIS is compulsory to be transparent in policy, organisation and budget, but mission and
operation are allowed to be clandestine, but these activities must be endorsed by law and constitution, and under supervision and oversight by outer and inner audit and inspection.
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German


English


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