Thalia Tzanetti
(RIEAS Senior Analyst)
Copyright: www.rieas.gr
Thursday’s (24 June 2010) terrorist attack against the Ministry of Citizen Protection, which claimed the life of a highly-regarded police officer, was the latest, most spectacular and lethal example of the recent rise in terrorist activity in Greece. It has not been a secret that high-profile attacks have been sought and that targets of increasing symbolism have been becoming the focus of terrorists’ attention. The fact that the perpetrators caught the whole security apparatus by surprise, however, and that they succeeded, not only unhindered but, as it turns out by the investigations, even unwillingly aided, to carry out the attack, is undoubtedly unprecedented and marks a significant victory for the terrorists.
What has created the actual terrorizing effect was the audacity of the perpetrators and most importantly their success in revealing the gaps or even the total lack of security procedures, in displaying the unimaginable vulnerability, and in portraying the security agencies incapable of effectively protecting what should have been one of the best-protected targets in the country. So far, investigations have shown that the letter-bomb was sent by regular mail to the political office of the Minister of Citizen Protection, and subsequently it was transported to the Ministry by a member of the office’s staff (some reports even claim that public transport was used). The lack of any security precaution in this process only out of a stroke of luck did not result in the loss of even more lives. The staff member, along with the mail, did not undergo any security check and the parcel ended up on the desk of the Minister’s adjutant, killing him brutally, at the heart of the Ministry where the Police HQ and the National Intelligence Service (NIS) are housed.In terms of the actual threat, this attack does not deviate from the recent course of similar events. It is not the aspiration and attempt to attack the Minister that is mesmerizing. Such an attack must have been anticipated and failing to do so is not a failure of imagination but a failure of judgment, or even worse an irresponsible failure to carefully read or effectively take into account the openly proclaimed terrorist intentions.
In recent attacks the perpetrators have chosen primarily targets of symbolic value. Symbolism has been central in the attacks of the last 18 months and the Minister of Citizen Protection is the jewel in the crown of symbolic targets. As in most terrorist attacks, the terrorists tried to identify the soft underbelly of the system and they chose the political office of the Minister since that’s where he could be expected to be more exposed. The events as they unfolded helped them achieve an even greater symbolic blow and revealed inconceivable gaps and omissions.
What differentiates this attack from previous is the remarkable boldness of the perpetrators and the unusual modus operandi. The method of the letter-bomb, which has been used rarely before in Greece, may be one more indication of a learning process of aspiring terrorists and actual perpetrators. In previous attacks, it became evident that new modi operandi were being imported and traditional methods were not the only ones chosen by terrorists anymore. The latest example may point to the same direction since the method of letter-bombs is know to have been used elsewhere and, if this trend of method spill-over continues, it may lead to the widespread adoption of a new set of similar methods with increased lethality.
The latest attack – as every new attack – has shed some more light on the threat posed by terrorist groups (terrorists’ ‘offense’). More than that though, and perhaps for the first time, it has also highlighted critical aspects relating vulnerability management and gaps in the protection of potential targets (authorities’ ‘defense’).
The inefficiencies of the porous security measures of the Ministry have long been evident to insiders and observers alike. To be fair, the physical and practical challenges of securing the Ministry are not negligible even to the inexperienced eye. The perimeter is difficult to monitor without currently unavailable technical support, the Ministry neighbors installations lacking sufficient lighting and visibility, patrolling is usually sporadic and limited to the night hours (some measures to secure the perimeter were put in place the morning after the attack), and any improvement would require strong will and a conscious investment in both financial; technical and human resources.
Visitors come in large numbers for a wide variety of purposes, goods and mail need to be checked and processed multiple times in a day, checkpoints are different for the Police and the NIS, and the staff changes very frequently so keeping records updated and everybody properly trained is no easy task.
Despite the difficulties though, it remains outrageous that the terrorists managed to reach so easily the Minister’s political office and even penetrate (although unintentionally) the security measures of the Ministry, which to the vast majority of outsiders was, until Thursday evening, presumed impenetrable. Reportedly, the technical tools were available and functioning. As most visitors prior to the Thursday attack can attest to though, the implemented security measures could only be characterized as loose and easily compromised.
Systems – and security systems alike – comprise various elements and procedures that need to be consistently implemented and synchronized. New advanced technical systems or new security plans, although possibly needed, can offer only marginal reassurance unless they are properly supported. The human factor remains quintessential when it comes to putting security systems in place and maintaining their effectiveness. What is critically missing is security awareness among staff, security training and the realization of individual responsibility when it comes to providing and maintaining security.
Security is a collective responsibility and procedures can not be treated as rules meant to be bent once so often, nobody can be exempt from them and everyone needs to step up and take responsibility instead of trying to pass it on to the next like a hot potato. For any security systems to work, rules need to be implemented consistently and universally, instead of leaving it up to each member of the staff to do his duty or opt for convenience or being liked.
What is perhaps more remarkable about Thursday’s attack is the communication aspect. The perpetrators chose a highly-symbolic target, given the Minister’s institutional role and emphasis on prosecuting terrorists. Although they tried to reach the Minister through the easier channel of his political office, where checks are expected to be looser, they managed to stage an attack where the Minister should be least accessible and vulnerable, in the safety of the Ministry, thus adding to the symbolism of the attack by underlining the incapacity of the security agencies.
According to Alex Schmid “[v]ictims of terrorism [….] serve as message generators” and are part of what he calls “threat and violence-based communications processes.” What the terrorists achieved on Thursday is to have a two-fold communication victory. The primary effect has been the immediate intimidating and terrorizing effect which has exceeded the magnitude of previous attacks, and admittedly also the ambitions of the perpetrators. The security apparatus was not targeted for the first time; the Police have been potential targets since the first attacks against them and it was well-known that higher-profile attacks were intended.
However, this intimidation is now affecting large numbers of politicians and public servants because of the seeming easiness to penetrate even a “hard” target like the office of the Minister of Citizen Protection, and the evident indifference of terrorists to casualties and “collateral” losses. The secondary effect that underlines the symbolic value of Thursday’s attack and may trigger further repercussions is the undermining of the credibility of the Police and the subsequent image of incapacity and ineffectiveness such a failure results in. These effects, along with the compromising feeling of security, are likely to outlive the current focus on the attack itself and will not be neutralized by any review of security procedures, future arrests or prosecution.
The terrorists are developing into skilled players of the communication game which is positioned at the very center of the choice of terrorism as a method.
Terrorism remains extremely effective in attracting attention and the lack or inefficiencies of basic security awareness, guidelines and protective measures makes it an even easier and more powerful tool. Unless vulnerability is better managed and unless the authorities decide to deny the terrorists victory in the communication battlefield, this effectiveness in getting the terrorist message across will maintain terrorism as an appealing method of choice.