TURKISH ORGANIZED CRIME: OUTLOOK, PERSPECTIVES AND CURRENT TRENDS
Michaletos Ioannis
(RIEAS Junior Analyst)
Copyright: www.rieas.gr
Outlook
Turkey is a country strategically located between the East and the West. Apart from its importance in political and military level, it is also an integral part of the international narcotics smuggling. It would just be very hard for heroin to travel from Central Asia to Europe without being able to trespass Turkey, the only Asian country bordering with Europe. Turkey is a state traditionally producing Opium , for pharmaceutical purposes. In the early 70’s international pressure –Mostly from Nixon administration in the USA- obliged Turkey to enforce stricter rules for Opium production in 1974. Up until then heroin was produced in Turkey as an Opium derivative and quantities were sold to the West with the assistance of the Sicilian and Corsican mafias .
The heroin to be sold was transported with ships to Sicily, and then to Marseilles were the Corsicans had created labs for the fabrication of the commercial product. From then onwards it was transferred to New York and other USA ports where the American-Italian mafia, under its network of the “26 Families” would assure its allocation in the end-users, the heroin addicts . The forceful USA administration at that time declared a war against narcotics and obliged the Turks to seek other sources of the lucrative opium. Soon enough Turkish-associated operational production bases were established in Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan. The war in the former during the 80’s, as well as, the resurge of the Kurdish guerilla fighting after 1984 and the Iraq-Iranian war the same period; created a convergence of political, criminal and military operations based in heroin trade.
Events such as the Iran-Contra scandal illuminate how far the heroin trade has penetrated the higher echelons of the world’s decision-making process and how it interacts with the international affairs. Moreover the effective destruction of Beirut during the 80’s collapsed the cities ubiquitous reputation as the prime port for narcotics trade and this role was overtaken by Istanbul . The situation after the end of the Cold War in 1989, found the Turks financially strong from their trade in the previous decades and also ready enough to pursue stronger ties with the countries of Central Asia, an aim vividly supported by the USA administrations.
Furthermore the appearance of the Albanians and the civil wars in former Yugoslavia, provided ample of human resources in the Balkans, eager in getting involved in the drugs trade so as to survive financially or gain capital to achieve their political aims. Europe now already hosted considerable Turkish minorities-Especially Germany - and individuals from those Turkish communities were used to act as local retail agents for the heroin distribution in Europe.
In 1996 the Susurluk accident revealed to Turkey the extent where the Drug –Lords have penetrated the upper crust of the society and they were able to conduct their businesses untouched by the law . Even the spouse of the then Turkish Prime Minister Tancu Tsiller has been widely accused for close interactions with notable underworld figures. Furthermore the accusations that the Turkish security forces were conducting drugs trade in South Eastern Turkey were in relation to the civil strife in that region because of the Kurdish fight and that presents once more that politics and criminal groups seem to go hand in hand.
The modus opperandi of the Turkish organized crime in drugs trade follows the role of the coordinator and distributor. Large amounts of heroin shipments enter Turkey each month and then delivered through the Balkan route mostly, to all over Europe . Historically, the Balkan route is the main overland connection between Asia and Europe. Every year, this route is taken by around 1,5 million lorries, 250,000 coaches, and four million cars .The most common way to transport heroin is a relatively small quantity of 20 to 50 kilos hidden in a lorry. Considering the scale of the trade on the Balkan trade, combined with the fact that it takes some hours to a whole day to search a lorry, explains why it is virtually impossible to really counteract these activities. It is estimated that 75 per cent of the heroin smuggled into Europe is transported along the Balkan route .
It has to be noted that the country with the largest Turkish community-Germany- is being used also as a redistribution centre. That means that when heroin reaches Germany, it is being handed out from there to the other major European markets, especially UK and Scandinavia. Moreover some of the strongest “Capo” of the Turkish syndicates resided in Germany and generally speaking this country has become the centre of gravity for the Turkish drug barons, as far as, their posture in the European narcotics scene is concerned . Further the impact of the Turkish drug lords has alarmed European security agencies due to the importance of their overall contribution in the narcotics market in the Continent. For instances since the 1970s, Turkey has accounted for between 75 and 90 per cent of all heroin in the UK. The key traffickers are Turks or criminals who operate along that route using Turkish contacts .
Perspectives
The alliance of Turkish and Albanian crime groups can be explained at first glance by the cultural, religious and ethnic links –A large percentage of Turks in W. Turkey has Albanian ancestry- . Also, the tradition of the Albanians to join and serve larger ethnic groups with whom they feel to have a kind of affinity might have its explanation. The same was he case in USA and New York especially where for decades the Albanian crime syndicates tended to operate under the aegis and influence of the much stronger American-Sicilian crime corporations.
A recent article in a regional investigative journalism media source revealed interesting facts for the interrelation between USA domestic politics, the role of the Turkish lobby and the American foreign policy . Even though it is extremely delicate to draw conclusive explanations about the real roots of cover the organized crime activities are given; it is beyond any reasonable doubt that in the case of the Balkans the West has dramatically failed to check the narcotics flow. Despite the fact that thousands of troops, intelligence officers and police ones are based in the Balkans assigned by NATO and the EU, there has been no real confrontation with the realities of criminal syndicate pervasion in the Balkans. On the contrary in the areas where the Western presence is more powerful like in Pristina, it is exactly the stronghold areas of the mafias and their collaborators .
Albanian ‘procurement groups’ mainly purchase heroin from Turkish wholesale traders who use Hungary more and more to establish heroin storage facilities, just as they do in Bulgaria and Romania . Turkish OC groups are increasingly linked to ethnic Albanian OC groups. Furthermore their experience in areas such as transportation, company formation and facilitation management is used for organised crime activities in the field of illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. Turkey is an important transit country for illegal immigration to the EU from, for example, China . Turkish OC groups are known to be involved in an array of legal businesses which are likely to be a method of laundering proceeds of heroin trafficking. Restaurants, bars, fast-food franchises, real estate agencies, travel agencies and vehicle repair shops are examples of such businesses.
Most heroin reaches Western Europe via the Balkan route. A good infrastructure of land,sea and air connections provide ample opportunity for the trafficking of heroin to the EU in which Turkey, due to its geographical position, plays a central role. In 2004, Turkish law enforcement agencies seized more than 6.5 tones of heroin and 4.5 tones of morphine base, in addition to over 100,000 litres of acetic anhydride, the principle chemical for heroin synthesis . In 2005 the narcotics confiscations were as follows: Heroin 10,283 kg Morphine Base 529 kg, Cannabis 23,884 kg, Opium 440 kg, AA 6,317 liters, Captagon 19,971,625 tablets and Ecstasy 2,492,200 tablets . Lastly the 2003 statistics on contraband drugs taken off the market are: Heroin 5,000 Kg (approximately), Morphine 8.000 Kg (Approximately), Opium 500 Kg (approximately) . As it can been seen there is a considerable amount of narcotics being seized each year in the Turkish market and if we take as an account that usually 10-15% of the total drug trade is actually brought in the hands of the police authorities; then an icon of a significant illegal trade can be assessed.
Turkish OC groups, usually hierarchical and homogeneous, continue to be important actors especially within the field of drug trafficking to the EU. Many Turks involved in OC in the EU are long-term residents within their host country, which assists them in developing links with non-Turkish OC groups and in their move towards other areas of crime . In this respect the collaboration between Turkish OC groups and Albanian ones, is integral for their effectiveness in exploiting large segments of the European market, in many different fields of illegal business.
Trends
Overt he past few years trends are emerging in concerning the Turkish OC that reflects a diversification process taking place. For instance the main route for trafficking firearms to Western Europe is from Turkey through Serbia and Montenegro . Turkey has a well developed Small & Medium Sized corporations manufacturing pistols and rifles, and a part of the production is increasingly finding its way through contraband action; into the Western markets and via the infamous Balkan route”, the exact same axis used to transport heroin and other narcotics. Furthermore, it seems that certain groups of Turkish origin residing permanently in Western Europe and most importantly in the Netherlands are being involved in the distribution of synthetic drugs from the country into Germany and Turkey. In exchange they are supplied with heroin or weapons. In essence they are diversifying their criminal activities by engaging in poly-drug and arms trafficking as well as crimes against persons .
The Turkish groups still compromise a formidable force in the exploitation of the heroin market in Europe and in the UK in particular. According to an NSCIS spokesman in 2006, “Turkish organised crime retains a tight control over the estimated 30 tons a year that feed into the UK. On average, the authorities seize only two tons per year”. Moreover, “These profits are made not by Afghan traffickers or the Taliban but by trafficking organisations in Turkey [and] UK-based, Turkish-organised crime groups” .
The diversification of the Turksih groups has also a geographical substance, since over the past few years; there has been an increased attention into setting up businesses and firms in Hungary to cover the drug shipments . Hungary is a newly member of the European Union, located right in the centre of Europe and close to the main markets of Germany, Italy and Poland. Moreover it retains laxer OC surveillance methods by its security forces and it has become a hub for Turkish, Albanian and Chinese groups . It is interesting to note that another field of business is the document forging one that according to Europol is accelerating as an illegitimate source of income for the Turkish OC .
The presence of the Turkish OC in the Netherlands has intensified its operations over the past few years. In recent years, authorities in Amsterdam have reported significantly increased activity by crime groups from the Balkans and Turkey. These groups specialize in smuggling immigrants, narcotics, and arms. Showing some specialization (Turkish groups have focused on narcotics, Slavic groups on arms), the groups have fought over markets and territories in the city . Police raids have found grenade launchers, explosives, and “heavy weapons suitable for warfare,” believed to be in transit from origins in Eastern Europe to terrorist groups. As it was mentioned in a previous paragraph, the Turkish OC has associated itself lately with the distribution of synthetic drugs. As a consequence the exportation of this kind of narcotics into Turkey has created social ills in the country. Turkey was in a very good position regarding drug use rates before ecstasy came along' statistics point to a sharp rise in the use of synthetic drugs among young Turks. Social and economic changes, drug prices and tourism are blamed for a trend that has also altered traditional smuggling patterns in the mainly Muslim country . It is important to note that the dumping of synthetic drug street prices was made possible by the European-Turkish OC syndicates that are actually finding their homeland as a lucrative locale for their operations, thus assisting in the social degradation of their own country.
The increase on the activities of the Turkish OC, over the past few years, can be illuminated through the survey of the money laundering activities that have expanded in the country. While the number of suspicious transaction reports submitted by Turkish financial institutions has "increased substantially," the level of reporting "remains low" when the "size and nature" of Turkey’s financial sector is considered. That was one of the key findings of the Financial Action Task Force's "Third Mutual Evaluation Report" on Turkey, which rated the country's anti-money laundering and counterterrorist-financing efforts . The major sources of criminal proceeds in Turkey are drug trafficking, smuggling, fraud, bankruptcy, document forgery, pillage, highway robbery, kidnapping, and "serious crimes against the state," according to the FATF report. The primary tools for laundrymen are money transfers and other banking transactions, commercial transactions, accounting transactions and real estate transactions, the FATF added .
Moreover, the annual OECD financial report for 2007, revealed the existence of the problem relating to money-laundering from OC activities. According to the report, “The number of convictions for money laundering in Turkey is relatively low, and the new legislation has not yet been in place long enough to fully demonstrate its effectiveness. Confiscation measures, although complete, have also not yet produced substantial results. The Turkish FIU is responsible for the receipt, analysis and dissemination of STR information for investigation by law enforcement. The number of STRs received, however, is relatively low” .
Continuing a closer examination reveals, an abundance of undeclared capital flowing in the country over the past five years that has its social and political ramifications as well. Between 2002 and 2003, the summary balance of payments for net error and omission category—basically unexplained income—increased from $149 million to almost $4 billion . Further, it is believed that Turkish-based traffickers transfer money to pay narcotics suppliers in Pakistan and Afghanistan, reportedly through alternative remittance systems. The funds are transferred to accounts in the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and other Middle Eastern countries. The money is then paid to the Pakistani and Afghan traffickers . The Turkish judicial system is lacking also the proper training to combat OC by pursuing an anti-money laundering policy. Between 2003 and 2005 more than 2,100 money laundering investigations were launched, but only eight had resulted in convictions. One factor contributing to this low conviction rate is the fact that Turkey’s police, prosecutors, judges, and investigators need additional training in dealing with financial crimes. In addition, there is a lack of coordination among law enforcement agencies, and between the courts that prosecute the predicate offenses and those that prosecute money laundering cases. Most of the cases involve non-narcotics criminal actions or tax evasion; but a considerable 30 percent are narcotics-related .
Illegal immigration and trafficking are inexorable related with the all-pervading OC groups worldwide. In this field, the Turkish crime syndicates have exploited the strategic geopolitical placement of the country, as an Asian gateway to Europe, in order to expand their operations. This is a truly global criminal enterprise and the profits are immense. According to the Foreign and Commonwealth office in the UK “Globally each year 500-700,000 people are trafficked, earning criminals $12-20 billion”, and that is a very conservative estimation. Most immigration crime facilitation groups prefer to work within their own ethnic and family backgrounds, and are mainly of British-South Asian, Chinese, Turkish, or Albanian ethnic origin. Criminals charge from £2,000 to £20,000 to bring someone into the UK. Typically repayment for the journey or accommodation provided can involve long-term menial and low-paid labor” . In 2004 it was noted that over one million illegal immigrants are “In transit” from Turkey towards the Western European countries. A third of them it was assumed they would be able to exit the country and head towards the European metropolis mostly, thus expanding the yearly capital profit output of OC groups dealing with this illegal industry .
Besides the position of being a "transit country", Turkey has gradually become a "target country" with more and more illegal immigrants entering Turkey via sea, air and land from Asian and African countries.
Facing increasing human trafficking, especially the women trafficking, Turkey introduced an action plan and launched a national task force in 2003 to cope with the issue. According to the Turkish Police Director General Gokhan Aydiner more than 500,000 illegal immigrants have been captured in the country over the past 10 years.
In an interview with local private NTV, Aydiner said, "The transportation of 575,516 illegal immigrants via Turkey has been hindered and 6,113 human traffickers from 39 different countries have been captured since 1995. "
A recent development relating to the aforementioned is the information leaked by security sources of the government of Pakistan, in the early summer period of 2007. According to this information, OC groups are transferring 10,000 illegal immigrants from Pakistan to Europe via Turkey and they were due to arrive –Most probably in the Greek Aegean Sea- by early September 2007 . The Greek security agencies are aware of that development, and allegedly an operation was being carried out by the Turkish police to locate the immigrants along with the criminal network responsible for their transfer. Up-to-date no other details of the aforementioned has being made publicly or it could be verified, apart from the statements by the Greek Foreign Minister, Mrs. Bakoyanni on the context of illegal immigration and the call towards strongest cooperation of the Turkish state; on the 30th of October 2007 in the Greek nationwide TV stations, after a inter-ministerial meeting with the Greek Prime-Minister. It should be noted in relation to the Turkish OC networks; that a recent edition in a daily Greek newspaper citing comments by National Intelligence Service officers relays nexus between the official Turkish state and the human trafficking networks .
The diversification and expansion of the Turkish OC groups, has prompted the Turkish state to initiate a series of bilateral and multilateral security agreements with neighboring countries, in order to curb the phenomenon. Synoptically the most important ones over the past five years are:
•Agreement between Azerbaijan Republic, Georgia and Turkish republic on combating terrorism, organized crime and other perilous types of crime, 30.04.2002
•Greek-Turkish protocol on combating organized crime, 21 June, 2002
•Ukrainian and Turkish organs for fighting organized crime agree to broaden cooperation, 05/03/2003
•UN, Turkey to Increase Cooperation against Drugs and Organized Crime, 3 September 2003
•Greece, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey conclude ministerial meeting on organized crime, 17 December 2005
An optimist data is the increase of drugs seizures by the Turkish police, as the BBC reported for 2004. The Turkish Interior Ministry boasts of a 149% increase in seizures of opium and opium derivates. The amount captured is almost equal to the total for the whole of Central and Western Europe. For heroin alone, the increase was 84% .
The general outlook and perspective for the Turkish Organised Crime groups, reveals a continuation of their strong role in the contemporary European environment, as well as, in Turkey. The heroin trade is mainly in the hands of second generation Turks residing in Germany that collaborate strongly with their Albanian counterparts in a variety of schemes. The interesting aspects that include trends in the operation of this OC groups is their diversification into the synthetic narcotics market, with the Netherlands as an epicenter. Moreover, Hungary is becoming a regional hub for the Turkish groups, as it has been for a number of other crime syndicates since the early 90’s. Illegal immigration is a lucrative trade originating from the transfer of Asians to Europe via Turkey, in a multi-billion illegal commerce that further empowers criminal groups.
It should also be mentioned, the serious peril that money laundering poses for Turkey, and the recent international reports indicate a substantial increase of informal capital inflow in the country. This information further correlates with the assumption that OC activities originating from Turkish citizens have increased considerable the past few years. The Turkish security forces have progressed steadfastly in forging regional agreements in order to combat the activities of OC groups, and have also increased their effectiveness in confiscating narcotics shipments, along with numerous arrests. What is important to highlight though; is the transnational aspect of the Turkish OC groups that calls for a coordinated Pan-European response, a subject that would most certainly include the confrontation with every ethnic crime syndicate operational nowadays in Europe. Lastly the main disadvantage of the Turkish opposition against Organised Crime is the lack of the appropriate skills in dealing with capital laundering and the transfer of illegal funds that fuel the support for OC groups and allow them to become more influential domestically and internationally.